Causation and Reliance in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5 by Whalen, Michael P.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 4 Article 3
1-1-1982
Causation and Reliance in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule lOb-5
Michael P. Whalen
Riordan, Caps, Carbone & McKinzie
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael P. Whalen, Causation and Reliance in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 13 Pac. L. J. 1003 (1982).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/3
Article
Causation and Reliance in Private
Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5
MICHAEL P. WHALEN*
CONTENTS
I. THE ORIGINS OF RELIANCE AND CAUSATION IN
THE COMMON LAW ....................................
A. The Causal Requirement-Reliance ...................
1. Causation in Law and Causation in Fact .........
2. Loss Causation and Transaction Causation .......
3. Justifiable Reliance-Unbelievability and
M ateriality ........................................
II. RELIANCE AND CAUSATION UNDER RULE 10b-5.
A. Scienter and Materiality ..............................
B. Reliance, Materiality and Causation ...................
1. The Non-Reliance Cases ..........................
2. The Background of Affiliated Ute .................
Page
1007
1009
1009
1011
1013
1015
1015
1016
1017
1018
* Associate, Riordan, Caps, Carbone & McKinzie, Los Angeles; A.B. cum laude, 1977,
Princeton University; M.A. 1978, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. cum laude, 1981,
Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Professor Louis Loss for suggesting the topic for
this article and for his guidance in its completion.
1003
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 13
a. Reliance and Omissions ........................ 1019
b. D u y .......................................... 1023
c. The Chasins Case ............................. 1024
d. The Mills Case ................................ 1028
3. Affiliated Ute ...................................... 1031
4. Implied or General Reliance? ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
a. Application of the Implied Reliance Theory ..... 1038
b. Simon v. Merrill Lynch ....................... 1040
c. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch ...................... 1041
d. Fridrich v. Bradford ........................... 1044
5. The Affiliated Ute Presumption in the Lower
Courts ............................................ 1046
a. Should the Presumption Apply Only to the Case
of Nondisclosure? .............................. 1046
b. Is the Presumption Rebuttable? ................ 1050
6. A Common Error in the Application of Affiliated
Vte ............................................... 1051
7. Fraud on the Market-Blackie v. Barrack ........ 1052
8. Causation and the Open Market .................. 1055
C. Reliance and Causation under the Federal Securities
Code ................................................. 1058
III. CONCLUSION ........................................... 1064
1004
1982 / Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5
Reliance established the necessary causal relationship between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs entrance into a transaction in
the common law action for misrepresentation.' This requirement was
incorporated directly from the common law into private actions under
Rule lOb-5. 2 The broad scope of private actions under Rule lOb-5,3
particularly in the context of omissions,4 called for the development of
a causal standard especially tailored for the rule. Thus, the Supreme
Court in Affiliated Lite Citizens v. United States,5 held that "under the
circumstances of [that] case," "positive proof of reliance" on an omis-
sion was unnecessary, and that an "obligation to disclose and [the]
withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causa-
tion in fact" for a private action under Rule lOb-5.6 This holding is
commonly referred to as the Ue "presumption" of reliance from
materiality.
The Court's reasons for this holding are difficult to decipher from
reading the opinion. Research into the background and authority cited
for the case indicate that the Court's holding is dependent on the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and defendant, in particular, the fact that
the plaintiff "generally relied" on the defendant.
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have adopted this view.' The Second
Circuit,8 however, interprets the Ute case quite differently, understand-
ing its holding to be independent of the relationship between the par-
ties and thus applicable to market trading. When, as in most cases,
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS §108, at 774-75 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROSSER].
2. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWNEFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §2.7(1),
at 55 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG & LOWNEFELS]; 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION
1430-44 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
3. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1981). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
The private right of action was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 60 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1947), modfed on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 61 (1947). The Supreme Court recognized
the private right of action in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Lfe & Ca. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
4. See text accompanying notes 75-83 infra.
5. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
6. Id at 153-54.
7. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-20 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, 482 F.2d 880, 883-84 (5th Cir. 1973).
8. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228, 238-40 (2d Cir. 1974).
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"general reliance" is present, the two interpretations of Ute give similar
results. However, even in those cases several uncertainties exist in the
application of the (te decision. An examination of lower court deci-
sions indicates that the "presumption" should be limited to cases in-
volving only omissions or involving both omissions and
misrepresentations, and that, if the presumption is applied, it should be
rebuttable.9
Most courts have not reached the question of whether "general reli-
ance" should be required or where the burden of proof on the issue
should lie, since such reliance is obviously present in the usual case of
personal dealings between the parties. Analysis of the Ute opinion in-
dicates that the plaintiff should have the burden of proving "general
reliance" before the Ute presumption applies.10
The Ninth Circuit has applied a Ute type presumption in the "fraud
on the market" situation" to imply causation from materiality. This
presumption is itself defensible in that context, but the Court also cre-
ates an expansion in the definition of causation in the market context.
This expansion is unfortunate because the proper focus for the decision
should not have been causation at all, but policy, a position also advo-
cated for the open market situation.
An examination of the dispute between the two interpretations of
Ute as applied to the open market leads to the conclusion that the Sixth
Circuit was correct in its application of Ute, but incorrect as a matter of
policy. 12 The idea of causation on a non-event, such as an omission, is
so tenuous that policy should be examined directly in determining lia-
bility. Such an approach has been adopted by the American Law Insti-
tute in the Federal Securities Code.'3
The Code eliminates the causation requirement in civil suits for lia-
bility in several common Rule lOb-5 situations, including the open
market situation and in cases where there is privity between the plain-
tiff and defendant.' 4 Limitations on damages and a deterrent intent
justify this change in the law. In addition, the theories developed in
Affiliated Ule indicate the appropriateness of the elimination of the
causal requirement where the Code has done so.
9. See text accompanying notes 204-218 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 219-221 infra.
11. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975).
12. See text accompanying notes 228-235 infra.
13. See FED. SEC. CODE §1703(a), (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
14. See notes 236-242 and accompanying text infra.
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I. THE ORIGINS OF RELIANCE AND CAUSATION
IN THE COMMON LAW
The development of reliance and causation under Rule lOb-5 cannot
be examined without a basic understanding of their role in the rule's
predecessor, the common law action for misrepresentation.15 To re-
cover under this action a plaintiff must show:
1) a false representation
2) of material fact,
3) scienter on the defendant's part including an intent to induce
4) and the inducement of plaintiff's justifiable reliance, and
5) resulting damages.' 6
The first requirement for the action is a misrepresentation. Nondis-
closures are not generally actionable at common law.17 However, in
two types of situations the law does imply a duty to disclose facts.' 8
The first situation is one in which there is an expectation of disclosure
from the relationship between the parties. The disappointment of this
expectation gives rise to civil liability for fraud where there is a fiduci-
ary or special confidential relationship between the parties. There is
also liability when the defendant is aware of facts "basic" to the trans-
action, as to which he knows plaintiff is acting under a misapprehen-
sion, when plaintiff could reasonably expect a disclosure due to the
"customs of the trade."' 9 The other situation in which an obligation to
disclose is imposed involves misleading statements and misrepresenta-
tions. When the defendant makes a statement, he must disclose enough
information so that it is not misleading.20 Anyone who has made a
statement which he discovers to be misleading must disclose such infor-
mation to anyone whom he knows to be still relying on it.21 Finally, if
a misrepresentation is not made with the expectation that it would be
15. See note 2 supra.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§525 (general liability for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion), 526 (scienter), 531 (expectation of influencing conduct), 537 justifiable reliance), 538 (mate-
riality) (1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§7.1, at 527-72 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES], PROSSER, supra note 1, §105, at 685-
86.
17. HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 16, §7.14, at 586; PROSSER, supra note 1, §106, at 695-96.
This rule of course reflected the dubious business ethics of the bargaining transactions
with which deceit was at first concerned, together with a touch of the old tort notion that
there can be no liability for nonfeasance, or merely doing nothing (footnote omitted).
PROSSER, supra note 1, §106, at 696. The terms "nondisclosure" and "omission" are used inter-
changeably in this paper.
18. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §551; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.14, at 586; PROS-
SER, supra note 1, §106, at 696.
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §551(2)(a)(e); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.14, at
589; PROSSER, supra note 1, §106, at 697-98.
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §551(2)(b); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.14, at 586-
87; PROSSER, supra note 1, §106, at 696.
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §551(2)(c); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.14, at 589;
PROSSER, supra note 1, §106, at 696-97.
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acted upon, but thp defendant later learns the plaintiff is about to act in
reliance upon it in~a transaction between them, the defendant must dis-
close its falsity.2
In addition, the defendant is liable for his nondisclosure if he con-
ceals or prevents the plaintiff from discovering material information.23
In these situations, the defendant is liable as if he had stated the nonex-
istence of the undisclosed1 facts.24 In fact, in most25 of these situations
defendant's conduct is very similar to an actual statement that these
facts were untrue. These situations are essentially ones of "action," not
"inaction." That is, none of these situations involves a "pure nondis-
closure."' 26 Thus, it is not surprising that the causal standard developed
for those cases and for misrepresentations proved to be inadequate for
nondisclosures in the context of Rule lOb-5.
Scienter, the element of intent required for the tort of misrepresenta-
tion "involves the intent that a representation shall be made, that it
shall be directed to a particular person or class of persons, that it shall
convey a certain meaning, that it shall be believed, and that it shall be
acted on in a certain way.' 28 The defendant must believe the matter is
not as he represents it to be or that he does not have the basis for his
representation or the confidence in its accuracy that he states or im-
plies.29 Mere negligence in holding the mistaken belief is not sufficient
22. REmSTATEMENT, supra note 16, at §551(2)(d); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.14, at
589.
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §550.
24. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§550, 551.
25. The exceptions are the fiduciary situation, the case of concealment and the case in which
the customs of the trade induce plaintiffs expectation of disclosure. The fiduciary case is really
one of breach of a fiduciary duty, not common law fraud. The concealment case is also not a real
nondisclosure case. The final case is essentially a sort of half-truth. Since the defendant knows
the plaintiff expects disclosure, his actions are really a misleading "statement" that the nondis-
closed facts are untrue.
26. That is, except for the fiduciary duty case which is explained in note 25 supra.
27. The causal standard is that of reliance, i.e., the plaintiff must show that he believed the
omitted facts were not true. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§546, 551 (defendant's nondisclosure
is treated as if he had represented that the omitted facts were true). This is reasonable since the
actionable nondisclosures are essentially half-truths, see note 25 supra, which give a basis for
formation of this belief. See text accompanying notes 206-207 infra. For the application to Rule
lOb-5 see text accompanying notes 110-114 infra.
28. PROSSER, supra note 1, §17, at 700. The Restatement does not require an "intent to
induce reliance" in defining scienter. Instead it restates the requirement as a limitation on the
class of plaintiffs who can recover from the defendant's misrepresentation. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 16, §§526 (scienter), 531 (expectation of influencing conduct).
There is no requirement that the defendant intend to harm the plaintiff. As Lord Blackburn
said:
The defendant might honestly believe that the shares of stock were capital investment,
and that they were doing the plaintiff a kindness by tricking him into buying them. I do
not say this is proved, but if it were. . . they are civilly responsible for a deceit.
Smith v. Chadwick, 9 App. Cas. 1-7, 201 (1884) citedin HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.3, at
532-33. "The law affords... protection against such 'favors'... and it is no defense in an action
for deceit that the defendant was a well meaning, though unscrupulously zealous, 'friend'."
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §526; PROSSER, supra note 1, §107, at 701.
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to support an action for misrepresentation?
This strict standard of intent affects the causal connection required
for the tort. In essence, there is no need for a proximate cause analysis
in intentional torts.31 However, the relaxation of the scienter require-
ment and the coverage of nondisclosures in the private action under
Rule lOb-5, greatly increase the need in those actions for such an
,i alysis. Thus duty, in a concept normally not present in common law
fraud actions, is an element in private actions under Rule lOb-5 for
nondisclosures. These concepts will be developed in more detail
below.32
A. The Causal Requirement-Reliance
As in all common law torts, the plaintiff must show a causal connec-
tion between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm to prevail
in a misrepresentation action.33 Plaintiff meets this requirement by
showing that he was injured by his reliance on the defendant's misrep-
resentation.3 4 This proof must satisfy the requirements of causation in
law as well as causation in fact.3 5 In addition, two related require-
ments, materiality of the misrepresentation and 'justifiability of belief'
must be satisfied.36
1. Causation in Law and Causation in Fact
The causation requirement is generally satisfied in tort law by show-
ing that the defendant's conduct was the "legal cause" or the "cause in
law" of the plaintiff's harm.37 For conduct to be a "legal cause" of an
event it must first, be a "cause in fact" of the event and then, be such
that the law on policy grounds should recognize it as a cause.3 8 Causa-
30. PROSSER, supra note 1, §107, at 701; "[IHonest belief in the truth [is] a complete defense,
under all circumstances, but anything short of such an actual and honest belief, on the party of the
defendant, will constitute fraud." HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.3, at 534.
31. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.13, at 584.
32. See text accompanying notes 128-129 infra.
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§546 (causation in fact), 548A (legal causation of pecuni-
ary loss); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.13, at 583; PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 714.
34. RESTATEm r, supra note 16, §§546, 548A; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.13, at
583; PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 714.
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§546, 548A.
36. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§537, 538; PROSSE, supra note 1, §108, at 715-20.
37. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.13, at 583; PROSSER, supra note 1, §42, at 244.
38. The actor's conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, [a cause in fact] and
b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his [conduct] has resulted in the harm.
REsTATEmENT, supra note 16, §431 (negligence).
As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes [in fact] which
are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in
imposing liability.
PROSSER, supra note 1, §41, at 236-37.
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tion in fact is established by showing that the harm would not have
occurred "but for" the defendant's conduct.39 Alternatively, "the de-
fendant's conduct is a cause [in fact] of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about. '40
To be a legal cause, conduct which is a cause in fact of harm must
also be of such a nature that policy requires the defendant's liability.41
This is not a question of causation at all, but one of policy.4 2 Thus,
there is the doctrine of "proximate cause," which, essentially, frames
the question in terms "of whether the defendant is under any duty to
the plaintiff, or whether his duty includes protection against such con-
sequences. 43 Thus, if the plaintiffs harm was outside of the "zone of
obvious danger from the defendant's conduct [as defined by tort pol-
icy], and so no harm to him was to have been anticipated," the conduct
is not a legal cause of the harm.44 This "zone of danger" can be
thought of as the zone of reasonably forseeable events.45 If the event is
an unforseeable result of the conduct (that is, "unlikely" in some
sense), then the conduct is not a legal cause of the harm.
This "legal cause" analysis is equivalent to that of "duty" in the
sense of common law torts.4 That is, once causation in fact is estab-
lished, the "proximate" cause question can be rephrased as "under the
relevant public policy should the court determine that the defendant
had a duty to the plaintiff such that he is liable for the harm he
caused?"'47
In misrepresentation actions, just as in other tort actions, there has
been some confusion between the concepts of causation in law and cau-
sation in fact. This confusion persists even in the analysis of causation
under Rule 10b-5. 48 It is, however, very important to distinguish be-
tween the two concepts in order to analyze causation correctly.
39. PROSSER, sufpra note 1, §41, at 238-39. Causation in fact also includes the case where the
defendant's conduct along with one or more other causes would each have been enough to pro-
duce the harm by itself, but which is not a "but for" cause because of the existence of the other
causes. PROSSER, supra note 1, §41, at 240.
40. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S. M.R. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1970)
cited in PROSSER, sufpra note 1, §41, at 240. The Restatement defines causation in fact in the
negligence situation as "a substantial factor in bringing about the harm," RESTATEMENT, supra
note 16, §431, which is present only if the harm would not have been sustained in its absence,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §432.
41. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §431; PROSSER, supra note 1, §42, at 244.
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §431(b); PRossER, supra note 1, §42, at 244.
43. PROSSER, supra note 1, §42, at 244.
44. PROSSER, supra note 1, §42, at 245.
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §435; PROSSER, supra note 1, §42, at 250.
46. PROSSER, supra note 1, §42, at 244-45.
47. See PROSSER, supra note 1, §42, at 244-45.
48. See text accompanying notes 175-176 infra.
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2. Loss Causation and Transaction Causation
The plaintiff in a misrepresentation action satisfies the causation re-
quirement by a showing that the defendant's conduct caused his eco-
nomic harm. He does this by proving that he relied on the
misrepresentation and was injured by that reliance.49 To prove reli-
ance plaintiff shows that he believed the misrepresentation and that be-
lief was a cause of his entrance5" into the transaction.5 Proof of
damages resulting from that reliance is easy as a matter of causation in
fact but must also meet the standard of proximate cause or causation in
law.5
2
A slightly different analysis of this causation requirement is useful in
the Rule lOb-5 setting. To facilitate the later use of this analytical
structure, it is now introduced in the common law context. To show
the requisite causal connection in the case of a misrepresentation under
Rule lOb-5, the plaintiff must prove "transaction causation" and "loss
causation. 53
Plaintiff proves transaction causation by showing that defendant's
conduct caused him to enter into the transaction. Loss causation is
shown by proof that his entrance into the transaction caused plaintiffs
claimed loss. Proof of both transaction and loss causation establishes
the requisite causal connection for the tort.
From the discussion of causation in fact and causation in law above,
it may be expected that both types of causation must be shown in each
of these causal links between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
harm. This is true theoretically, and may have some importance in the
context of Rule lOb-5,54 but in the common law misrepresentation ac-
tion, the analysis is not so complicated. The transaction causation link
only requires a causation in fact analysis; the loss causation link is
shown through legal cause. Transaction causation in this setting re-
49. PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 714-20.
50. Reliance can result in plaintiff refraining from entering into a transaction. This is also
actionable at common law. PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 714-20. See note 107 infra. For
simplicity, reference throughout this paper is made only to the positive effect.
51. PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 714-20.
52. "A fraudulent misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action
or inaction in reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result from
the reliance." RESTATEmENT, supra note 16, §58A (Legal Causation of Pecuniary Loss).
The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to recover as damages in an
action of deceit against the maker the pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepresenta-
tion is a legal cause, including (a) the difference between the value of what he has re-
ceived in the transaction and its purchase price or other value given for it; and
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the recipient's reliance upon
the misrepresentation.
REsTATErMENT, supra note 16, §549(1).
53. See note 95 infra.
54. See text accompanying notes 128-129 infra.
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quires no legal cause analysis because there is no need for policy limi-
tations on causation in fact in this causal link. That is, if defendant's
conduct causes plaintiff to enter into a transaction, there is no need to
limit defendant's liability for resulting damages through, for example,
plaintiffs unexpected reliance. No such limitation is necessary because
misrepresentation is an intentional tort. 5  Given scienter, with its ele-
ment of an intent to induce reliance, there is no need for policy limits
on the defendant's liability for damages resulting from that reliance.
Thus, transaction causation in the common law involves only a cau-
sation in fact analysis. Plaintiff proves transaction causation by show-
ing that the defendant's misrepresentation caused him to enter into the
transaction. This, in turn, is shown by proof of plaintiffs reliance, that
is, plaintiff believed the misrepresentation and this belief caused him to
enter into the transaction. Transaction causation, then, is just reliance
in the common law setting, a causation in fact analysis.5 6
Causation in the loss causation link involves both causation in fact
and legal cause. Causation in fact is merely a requirement that plain-
tiff's entrance into the transaction caused his loss. This is normally
obvious in the common law setting. The real thrust of loss causation is
whether the defendant as a policy matter should be liable for the dam-
ages resulting from the plaintiffs transaction. For example, the de-
fendant is not liable for completely unforseeable consequences of the
reliance.57  Thus, loss causation in the common law is essentially a
question of legal cause.
Under either analysis, an important aspect of the causation require-
ment in the common law is obvious: the standard is constructed for
misrepresentations. Transaction causation, reliance, is based on belief
in the misrepresentation. Extension of this concept to nondisclosures5 8
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §435A; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.13 at 584.
56. A mild form of legal cause does apply to transaction causation in the common law. Orig-
inally courts restricted the class of possible claimants by use of the scienter doctrine, which cer-
tainly constituted a strict form of legal cause. This proving too strict however, they changed to a
more moderate form of legal cause, holding that there was sufficient scienter if there was scienter
vis-a-vis another person and the present plaintiffs reliance was reasonably forseeable. PROSSER,
supra, note 1, §107, at 702-04. The Restatement also applies a minor "legal cause" analysis to
transaction causation.
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons...
whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon
'the misrepresentation for pecuniary loss suffered by them through their justifiable reli-
ance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct
to be influenced.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §531. The Reporters add a caveat to section 531:
The Institute expresses no opinion on whether the liability. . . may extend beyond
[this] rule. . . to other persons or other types of transactions, if reliance upon the repre-
sentation in acting or in refraining from action may be reasonably foreseen.
57. See note 52 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 118-127 infra.
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in the context of Rule lOb-5 will prove to be a difficult matter.
3. Justable Reliance-Unbeievability and Matertality
Even if the defendant's misrepresentation might be shown to be the
cause of the plaintiffs harm, the common law excuses the defendant
from liability if he can show that the plaintiffs reliance was not "justi-
fied."59 The defendant can prove this in two ways. He can show that
the misrepresentation was so unbelievable that the plaintiff had no
business relying on it.6" Alternatively, the defendant can show that the
misrepresentation was of a matter so trivial (immaterial) that the plain-
tiff's reliance was "unjustified."61
The standard for the justifiability of the plaintiff's belief in the mis-
representation is not high. "The plaintiffs conduct must not be so ut-
terly unreasonable, in the light of the information open to him, that the
law may properly determine that his loss is his own responsibility."62
The justification for this requirement seems to be the practical difficul-
ties of proof in these situations and the "corresponding opportunity for
fraud and injustice."63 The apparent unfairness of this result may be
required by the difficulty of administering the system. "Moreover,
there is the attitude, . . that a person may be so great a fool that the
law cannot protect him even from a knave."64
Indeed the cases barring recovery under this standard are those in
which the plaintiff put his faith in misrepresentations that "any such
normal person would recognize. . . as preposterous,. . . or which are
• . so patently and obviously false that [the plaintiff] must have closed
his eyes to avoid discovery of the truth ... ."I' Thus, this is a minor
limitation on causation. The plaintiff need only exercise a minimal
amount of care in entering the transaction.66
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §537; PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 715-20.
60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §541 (representation known to be or obviously false);
PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 715-18.
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §538 (materiality); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.9,
at 565-70; PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 718-20.
62. PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 715. This standard is not strict.
[Tihe person deceived is not held to the standard of precaution, or of minimum knowl-
edge, or of intelligent judgment, of the hypothetical reasonable man, that people who are
exceptionally gullible, superstitious, ignorant, stupid, dim-witted, or illiterate, have been
allowed to recover when the defendant knew it, and deliberately took advantage of it.
PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 717.
63. Harper & McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. Rav. 939,
943 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Harper & McNeely].
64. Harper & McNeely, supra note 63, at 944.
This rule may contain low ethical implications, but it most certainly conforms with com-
mon sense. Therefore, it may be said to conform to the law and popular morality, al-
though it may not conform either to ideal justice or to ethics.
Harper & McNeely, supra note 63, at 943.
65. PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 716.
66. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §541.
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Even though the plaintiff is justified in believing a misrepresentation,
it might be so unimportant that he is not legally justified in entering
into a transaction based on that belief.' Without this legal limitation,
it would be
exceedingly dangerous for parties to conduct the ordinary business
transactions of the day. It frequently happens that representations
are made, while negotiations are pending, not strictly true. They
may relate to the subject matter, or have little or no reference thereto.
Neither party may place the slightest reliance thereon, yet, should a
dispute thereafter arise, how easy for the person who imagined he
was injured to assert he relied upon the representations made-be-
lieved them to be true-and, so believing, was thereby induced to
make the contract in dispute.68
In short, the plaintiff should not be able to use any "misrepresenta-
tion as a pretext for escaping a bargain he is dissatisfied with on other
grounds.' 69 Thus, an objective standard of "importance," material-
ity,70 has been developed. A misrepresentation is "material" if a rea-
sonable man would be expected to attach importance to it in
determining his choice of action.7' A misrepresentation is also material
if it is intended to deceive and the maker knows that the recipient is
"peculiarly disposed to regard it as important, even though the stan-
dard reasonable man would not do so. ''72
Materiality is very close to reliance itself. If a material fact is misrep-
resented then, "a reasonable man would be expected to attach impor-
tance to it in making his choice of action," which is almost the same as
saying that a reasonable man would rely on it, if he believed it. Thus,
given materiality and justifiable belief (a minor requirement) the plain-
tiff really only needs to show that he is a reasonable man to establish
reliance.73 This close relationship between materiality and reliance
plays an important role in the development of the causal connection
67. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§537, 538, 540; PROSSER, supra note 1, §108.
68. Hall v. Johnson, 41 Mich. 286, 289-90, 2 N.W. 55 (1876), quotedin HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 16, §7.9, at 567.
69. PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 719, (quoting Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentatlon, 2
OKLA. L. REv. 56, 59 (1949)).
70. See note 67 supra.
71. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §538, at 2; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 16, §7.9, at 565-
66; PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 719.
[Miatters entirely collateral to a contract, and apparently of no significance to any rea-
sonable man under the circumstances have been held to be immaterial: the defendant's
social, political and religious associations, his motive or purpose in entering the bargain,
the details of a seller's title, where good title is still conveyed,. . . and many other items
of similar nature (footnote omitted).
PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 719.
72. PROSSER, supra note 1, §108, at 720. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §538, at comment
f
73. See text accompanying notes 139-142 infra.
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required for private actions under Rule lOb-5.74
II. RELIANCE AND CAUSATION UNDER RULE lOb-5
Rule lOb-5 71 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in 194211 under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.77 There is now a widely recognized private action under the rule
to recover damages for securities fraud.78  Though the action is based
on the common law action for misrepresentation,79 its scope is much
broader."0 In particular, the rule explicitly forbids nondisclosures of
material facts, though only in the context of actual statements.81 The
courts, however, have construed "scheme to defraud" in clauses (a) and
(c) of the rule to include the case of complete silence when there is a
duty to speak. 2
The scienter requirement (including "intent to induce reliance") is
much less stringent in Rule lOb-5 actions.8 3 These changes in the ele-
ments of the common law action for misrepresentation have resulted in
changes in the nature of the required causal connection.
A. Scienter and Materiality
Until 1976 there was a controversy whether scienter should be re-
quired to prove a case for Rule lOb-5.84 In that year the Supreme
Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hoehfelder85 that scienter is required.
However, the actual holding of Hochfelder was quite narrow. The
court merely held that negligence was not enough to prove an action
for Rule lOb-5. Thus, though the exact requirement is not well defined
at this time, the intent to be proven for Rule lOb-5 is not nearly as
stringent as for common law fraud. Fraud covered under Rule lOb-5
for most of its history was not an intentional tort. It probably still is
not."6 In addition, there seems to be no requirement at all in the action
74. See text accompanying notes 139-144 infra.
75. See note 3 supra.
76. Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942); see generally BROMBERG, supra note 2,
§2.2, at 2:18 (background of the rule).
77. 15 U.S.C. §7j(b) (1976).
78. See note 3 supra.
79. See note 2 supra.
80. BROMBERG & LOWNEFELS, supra note 2, §2.7(1), at 55; Loss, supra note 2, at 1435-36.
See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963). Hooper v. Mountain States Securi-
ties Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
81. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1981).
82. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); BROMBERG &
LOWNEFELS, supra note 2, §2.6(2), at 51; Loss, supra note 2, at 1439; see Speed v. Transamerea
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
83. See text accompanying notes 85-92 infra.
84. BROMBERG & LowNEFELs, supra note 2, §8.4(501), at 204.101.
85. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
86. See BROMBERG & LowNEFELs, supra note 2, at §8.4(50).
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that the defendant intended to induce plaintiff's reliance.87
The change from an intentional tort in the common law to a some-
what less intentional tort under Rule lOb-5 has had an effect on the
nature of the transaction causation required to be proved. In particu-
lar, "duty" is now an element to be proven in cases of nondisclosures. 8
This "legal cause" requirement stems partially from the relaxed scien-
ter standard. It is discussed in more detail below. 89
The materiality requirement for private actions under Rule lOb-5 is
the same as for common law fraud, "would a reasonable man find the
fact important in making the decision whether to enter into the transac-
tion or not?"90 Because of its similarity to reliance,91 materiality plays a
major role in cases of nondisclosure. In fact, materiality has almost
replaced reliance as the test of causation after the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Affiliated Ute.92
B. Reliance, Materiality and Causation
The private action under Rule lOb-5, like the common law fraud
action, is compensatory in nature. Thus, in order to recover damages
the plaintiff must do more than show that the defendant violated the
rule; he must show that the defendant "caused" the loss complained
of.9
3
Under the framework developed above94 the causal requirement
under Rule lOb-5 can be thought of as two separate issues: first, trans-
action causation, the defendant's conduct must cause the plaintiff to
enter into the securities transaction, and second, loss causation, the
plaintiff's entering into the securities transaction must cause the
claimed economic loss. 95
This article is concerned only with transaction causation.96 Except in
87. BROMBERG & LOWNEFELS, supra note 2, at §8.4(501).
88. See text accompanying notes 128-130 infra.
89. See text accompanying notes 128-130 ihfra.
90. TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
91. See text accompanying notes 139-142 infra.
92. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
93. The purpose of the rule "is to qualify, as between insiders and outsiders, the doctrine of
caveat eptor-not to establish a scheme of investor's insurance." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), cer. denied sub non, List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); 6 Loss,
supra note 2, at 3876-80.
94. See text accompanying notes 49-58 supra.
95. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-82 (2d Cir. 1974); Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actionsfor
Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L. 107, 123-24 (1970). This terminology is not now generally in use
by courts, see Justice Frankel's concurrence in Schlick, 507 F.2d at 384, but it is useful here to
distinguish between the two causal links implicit in a fraud "causing" a loss.
96. Loss causation in Rule lOb-5 is the same as in the common law, a legal cause analysis of
damage resulting (in the sense of causation in fact) from plaintifi's reliance. See, e.g., Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1978); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
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a few unusual cases,97 the requirement of transaction causation (hence-
forth shortened to "causation") is the same as that of reliance, i.e., the
plaintiff believed what the defendant misrepresented and this belief
caused him to enter into the transaction. Thus, in most cases, reliance
is the equivalent of causation. For this reason, most courts9" required
reliance to be proved until the Supreme Court decided Mills v. Electric
Avto Lite Co. 99 and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 00 cases
which hold that, in certain circumstances, causation can be established
by proof of materiality.
L The Non-Reliance Cases
It is, of course, possible for a misrepresentation to cause a plaintiff to
enter into a securities transaction without the plaintiff believing the
misrepresentation and acting on that belief. In such a case transaction
causation in fact can be proven without a showing of reliance. In Vine
v. Benefcial Finance Co. , o1 the defendant corporation made misrepre-
sentations to a group of its fellow shareholders in a company, for the
purpose of buying their stock. According to the plaintiff's allegations,
enough of these shareholders sold, in reliance on the misrepresenta-
tions, for the defendant to gain sufficient control of the target corpora-
tion to force a short form merger. The plaintiff, who had had no
misrepresentations made to him, was thus forced to give up'0 2 his
shares. Clearly plaintiff did not rely on the representations. However,
he was forced to sell his stock because of the misrepresentations.
Therefore, there was transaction causation. The Second Circuit held
that the plaintiff was a "seller," that is, that he entered into a transac-
tion.'0 3 It continued, "[Reliance is] unnecessary in the limited instance
when no volitional act is required. ... What must be shown is that
there was deception which misled [the other] stockholders and that this
was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury."' 4 Thus, the court
recognized in this situation that, given proof of transactional causation
in fact, reliance is not necessary.' 0 5
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); discussion in FED. SEC. CODE §202(19),
comment 5(b), at 61 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
97. See, ag., Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981); Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d
627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1969).
98. 6 Loss, supra note 2, at 3876-78.
99. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
100. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
101. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
102. Plaintiff did have a choice of using his statutory appraisal rights. Id at 635.
103. Id
104. Id
105. The Court did not, however, use the words "transaction causation."
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In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. ,106 the defendant corpo-
ration thwarted a tender offer by the plaintiff corporation by bidding
up the price of the target's stock on the last day of the offer by buying it
on the market and selling it privately at a loss. This conduct was not
disclosed to the target's shareholders, who, thinking the value of their
stock had increased, refused to tender. Thus, the tender offeror, with-
out relying on the nondisclosure, was prevented from buying the out-
standing shares by the nondisclosures. In this case, there was
transaction causation, the nondisclosures prevented1 7 the tender of-
feror from completing the transaction, without reliance. The Second
Circuit, citing Vine, again held that since there was causation in fact,
reliance was unnecessary to establish Rule lOb-5 liability.
The Second Circuit in these cases correctly extended the scope of the
causation connection required for fraud. The court recognized that the
compensatory nature of the fraud action requires only that transaction
causation, not reliance, be proven. Reliance is merely the most normal
form in which transactional causation appears.
These two cases stand for nothing more than the proposition that in a
lOb-5 action, it is sufficient that the plaintiff show transactional causa-
tion in fact if no reliance could have occurred. The scope of these cases
is limited. The type of case to which they apply, where reliance is not
the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plain-
tiff's transaction is rare. Oddly enough, however, they are cited as sup-
port for a change in the reliance requirement in an important case in
which reliance is the causal connection, Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
Inc. 108 This case will begin the study of the role of causation in the
normal Rule lOb-5 omission case.
2. The Background of Affiliated Ute
The proper foundation has now been laid for an analysis of the back-
ground and present role of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Affiliated Ute. That case, like most of the remaining cases to be ex-
amined, involves nondisclosures rather than misrepresentations. InAf-
filiated Ute the Court decided that, under the circumstances of that
106. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
107. Transaction causation can occur by the fraudulent prevention of, as well as by the causa-
tion of, the plaintiffs entrance into a transaction. This has long been the rule in common law of
misrepresentation. Butler v. Watkins, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 456 (1871). See note 50.supra. However,
the Supreme Court has limited the private right of action under Rule lOb-5 to buyers and sellers.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1974). The Federal Securities Code has,
however, preserved the Crane holding in Section 1719(e). See Fed. Sec. Code §1710(c), comment(Proposed Official Draft 1978) on the effect of Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1967) on
Crane.
108. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
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case, an obligation on the defendant's part to disclose accompanied by
a nondisclosure of material information "establish" causation in
fact. 109
Examination of the background of this case and close scrutiny of its
reasoning aids in understanding what exactly the Supreme Court's lan-
guage inAffiliated Ute means and gives a guide for criticism of its inter-
pretation in the lower courts.
a Reliance and Omissions
The extension of common law fraud to nondisclosures under Rule
lOb-5 necessarily created the problem of what causal connection be-
tween the plaintiff's actions and the defendant's nondisclosure should
be required to establish liability." 0 In the limited action for nondisclo-
sure under the common law this problem did not arise. What actiona-
ble nondisclosures there were, with the exception of the case of a
fiduciary relationship, "' all were of the sort in which there was either a
misleading statement or a misrepresentation. 12 Reliance on the mis-
representations could be shown as in the normal case. In the case of
the misleading statement, the defendant was treated as if he had stated
that the facts which he knew were necessary to make his statements not
misleading, were not true." 3 The plaintiff had to show that he believed
these facts were false to show reliance." 4 This seemingly hard burden
was lessened considerably because the plaintiff could merely point to
the misleading statement and claim that, believing it, he naturally be-
lieved that the omitted facts were false.
The only real nondisclosure actionable at the common law was one
involving a fiduciary duty. That very special relationship between the
parties meant that the action was not really one of common law fraud,
and, as such, it will not be discussed further here.
Under Rule lOb-5 the situation is much more difficult. Nondisclo-
sures are actionable in many more situations, including those in which
there was no contact between the parties at all. This was an entirely
different situation from the common law. It is not, even now, clear how
to establish "reliance" or causation in the case of nondisclosures, espe-
cially where there is no contact between the parties." 5
109. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972).
110. See, ag., 6 Loss, supra note 2, at 3878-80.
111. REsTATEMENT, supra note 16, at §551(2)(a). The case in which the defendant did not
disclose "facts basic to the transaction" is essentially a case of misleading conduct. See text ac-
companying notes 15-22 supra.
112. RESTATEmENT, supra note 16, at §551(2)(b)-(e).
113. REsTATEmENT, supra note 16, at §551(1), (2)(b).
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at §546.
115. See text accompanying notes 231-233 infra.
1019
Pacfc Law Journal / Vol 13
Three approaches to the problem have been used. The first was to
define reliance on an omission along the lines of the common law and
require its proof. The second approach, developed in List v. Fashion
Park, Inc.,I16 was to abandon reliance altogether and merely show that
the omission was the cause in fact of the transaction. The third was to
"presume" reliance on the omission from general reliance on the de-
fendant's actions. Only the latter two are viable definitions, the first is
unworkable in the Rule lOb-5 context.
The first definition of reliance on an omission follows that of reliance
on a misrepresentation. Reliance on a statement means two things:
first, belief in the trust of the statement, and second, action (or inaction)
on that belief. Immediately two issues arise in writing a definition:
How could plaintiff "believe" in an omission that, by definition, he had
no knowledge of? What does it even mean for the plaintiff to "believe
in an omission?" The natural answer is that an omission is like a repre-
sentation that the omitted facts were not true." 7 For example, if A sells
B a car and omits to tell B that it has no brakes, A's omission is like a
statement that the car does have good brakes. Though this is not logi-
cally rigorous, it does have a certain common sensical charm. Thus, to
"believe in an omissioh" is to believe in a hypothetical statement that
the omitted facts were false. Given this analysis the next step, "to act
or not act because of this belief in the omission" became "to act (or not
act) because of the belief in the hypothetical statement that the omitted
facts were false." Under this scenario reliance on an omission would
be proved by showing that the plaintiff believed the omitted facts were
false and acted on that belief.
The problem with this approach is that in most cases the plaintiff
probably never even thought about the omitted facts. The case of a
bare omission is thus very different from the common law case of a
misleading statement, where the plaintiff has a basis both for believing
the falsity of the omitted facts and for proving this belief.1 8
In the case of the bare omission, plaintiff did not believe the facts
were false-he had no belief one way or the other. However, he might
be able to show that had he known the omitted facts were true he
would have acted differently.
For example, in List v. Fashion Park, Inc. ,' 1 plaintiff sold stock to a
group of people including an insider, a director of the company. In a
Rule lOb-5 suit, plaintiff claimed the defendant insider had not dis-
116. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom., List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
117. This is the treatment under the common law. See note 27 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 205-206 infra.
119. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. deniedsub no=., List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
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closed material information, his identity as a director. The plaintiff
claimed that he would not have sold the stock if he had known the
identity of the defendant buyer. The district court held that there was
no reliance on this omission in a suit under Rule lOb-5 because plaintiff
had no belief that the buyer was not a director, thus following the defi-
nition developed above.
This harsh approach was deservingly rejected by the Second Circuit:
[W]e do not agree with ... the trial court ... concerning the mean-
ing of 'reliance' in a case of nondisclosure under Rule l0b-5. [Its]
opinion intimates that the plaintiff must prove he actively relied on
the silence of the defendant, either because he consciously had in
mind the negative of the fact concealed, or perhaps because he delib-
erately put his trust in the advice of the defendant. Such a require-
ment, however, would unduly dilute the obligation of insiders....
The proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced
to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to
him the undisclosed fact. 120
This List test is clearly not one of reliance, but one of simple causa-
tion in fact. Any "reliance" test would by definition have to include an
element of belief. The Second Circuit's test does not. Instead it is pre-
cisely a "but for" causation test-if no omission then plaintiff would
have acted differently. Thus, without specifically saying so, the Second
Circuit did away with reliance in cases on nondisclosures, substituting
the more basic causation in fact requirement.
If the List standard is limited to the facts of the case, involving per-
sonal dealings, it seems to be quite reasonable. However, the reasoning
behind it does not seem to be dependent upon the relationship between
the parties. If the standard is not so limited, then causation by a non-
disclosure is really little more than that of materiality, because any rea-
sonable man would act differently, by definition, upon being disclosed
a material fact. 2 ' Not only does the List standard thus establish causa-
tion in most cases where materiality is present, it places almost no lim-
its on the class of possible defendants. If the plaintiff trades without
knowledge of a material fact, which would have caused him to act dif-
ferently had he known it, then all who did not disclose the fact to him
caused his injury under the List standard. This is true because the List
120. 340 F.2d at 463.
121. This is a slight overstatement. The materiality in the Rule lOb-5 context is "whether a
reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented or omitted in determining his
course of action." TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976); FED. SEC.
CODE §202(92) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). Thus, the assumption that the plaintiff is a reason-
able man only implies that he would consider the fact important in making his decision to enter
into the transaction. Another minor assumption is needed to say he would then have not entered
into the transaction. In addition, to rely he must believe the statement, another minor assumption.
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test requires only an omission, not any personal contact between the
parties. Thus, even Aunt Minnie from Oshkosh (regardless of whether
she knew the information or not) caused'22 the plaintiff to enter into the
transaction under the List standard, because she did not disclose the
material facts to him and he would have acted differently if she had
(assuming he would have believed her). Thus, causation under the List
standard, once materiality is established, is little limitation on the Rule
lOb-5 action for nondisclosure. 123
Some courts have refused to reduce the causation issue to materiality
by declining to follow the List standard. These courts have developed
an alternative to List which may be called the General Reliance The-
ory.124 This theory has two parts: first a requirement of plaintiffs "gen-
eral reliance" 12 on the defendant before reliance on an omission can
be proven. 126 This requirement is discussed more fully below. Second,
parallel to the List standard, the General Reliance Theory gives a way
of establishing reliance on an omission. The theory states that "general
reliance" on the defendant establishes (perhaps rebuttably) specific reli-
ance on material omission. 27 In the case of personal contact between
the parties, the tests may give similar results. In impersonal situations,
however, the results are dramatically different.
In the personal dealing case the two standards focus on slightly dif-
ferent factors. The List test is one of causation in fact. Thus, it sepa-
rates the omission (the "bad action") out of the defendant's conduct,
and looks to see whether that omission caused the plaintiff to enter into
the transaction. The General Reliance test, on the other hand, is one of
reliance or belief. It focuses on the plaintiffs reliance on all the de-
122. Of course, Aunt Minnie had no duty to disclose and hence would suffer no liability. The
point here is that she was a cause nonetheless.
123. This result in not as unusual as it may seem. In the common law of negligence a similar
result occurs. Consider the case of a driver who is injured when his car runs into a train. He
claims the defendant neglected to put up a "Danger-Train Crossing" sign which would have
prevented the accident. Assuming the plaintiff can prove he would have stopped in time had the
sign been there, there is no question that the defendant was the cause in fact of the accident. Aunt
Minnie was also the cause in fact of the accident, since she did not put up the sign either. How-
ever, she will not be held liable for the damages because she was not the "legal cause" of the
accident since she had no duty to put up the sign in that situation. See text accompanying notes
128-131 infra.
124. This theory, advocated in this article as the proper interpretation of Vte is a combination
of the positive ideas of Chasms v. Smith, Barney Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1970), and Mills v.
Electric.4uto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) with the negative ones of Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d
307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); and Shapfro v. MerrillLynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974).
125. "General reliance" means reliance on the defendant's conduct as a whole. See text ac-
companying notes 135-136 infra.
126. This "requirement" is developed in Fridrich and Shapiro. See note 124 supra and text
accompanying notes 181-182, 197-198 infra.
127. This way of proving causation is developed in Chasins and Mills. See note 124 supra and
text accompanying notes 139-143 infra.
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fendant's actions. Given a material omission, there is a violation of the
rule and since plaintiff relied on these "totar' actions there is liability.
This can also be viewed as the general reliance on the defendant's ac-
tions giving rise to a presumption of specific reliance on the omission.
These two definitions of "reliance" on an omission reflect basically
different views on the scope of the private action under Rule lOb-5.
These theories will be very important in the coming analysis of Rule
lOb-5 omission cases, especially in understanding Affiliated Ute. Fi-
nally, theories dependent on the two views of reliance on omissions will
dictate different results in the open market fraud situation.
b. Duty
In the common law there is very little legal cause analysis in deter-
mining transaction causation.128 This is true for two reasons. First a
strong form of scienter is required as an element of the tort. This intent
itself creates a duty on the defendant's part to the plaintiff not to de-
fraud him. Second, nondisclosures are not actionable at common law
except in very limited circumstances. Since nondisclosures are made to
everyone, in contrast to misrepresentations which are made only to a
limited group, if they were actionable, some limitations on transaction
causation would be needed. Thus, the plaintiff in common law actions
did not have to show that the defendant had a "duty" towards him;1 29
proof of transaction causation was enough.
In the private actions under Rule lOb-5, on the other hand, a "duty"
or legal cause analysis is needed. Scienter under the rule is only a com-
paratively toothless remnant of the common law of fraud. Nondisclo-
sures are actionable in a great variety of situations. Since, under the
List test,1 30 a nondisclosure can "cause" an almost unlimited number
of plaintiffs to enter into transactions and because the focus of a scien-
ter now has little to do with intent vis & vis a particular plaintiff, a limi-
tation on causation in fact is required to reduce the class of possible
claimants.
"Duty" therefore became an element of proving Rule 10b-5 cases for
nondisclosure. 3' That is, plaintiff has to show, as a threshold issue,
that defendant had a duty to disclose the nondisclosed information to
him. This duty requirement might have been described as a part of
128. See text accompanying notes 121-123 supra.
129. In two of the ways a nondisclosure can be actionable some sort of "duty" must be proved.
See text accompanying notes 15-27 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 121-123 supra.
131. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228,235-38 (2d Cir. 1974); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 438 F.2d
1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1970).
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"legal cause" analysis in the common law; in this case, "legal cause" is
the transaction causation link of the causal requirement. It can be
more simply thought of as just another element of the action.
The problem that arises with this duty question is not whether it is a
separate element of the private action or merely a part of transaction
causation, but whether it has any bearing on causation in fact. Which-
ever way it is considered there is no ambiguity-duty is completely in-
dependent of causation in fact. Yet, in the cases to follow, the Supreme
Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals get somewhat confused
on this point.
. The Chasins Case
The foundation for the Supreme Court's reasoning in Affiliated Ule
was the Second Circuit's decision in Chasins v. Smith, Barney, & Co.,
Inc. 132 This case involved the purchase by plaintiff Chasins of stock on
the recommendation of his broker, Smith, Barney & Co., Inc. The de-
fendant brokerage firm sold him the stock without disclosing to Cha-
sins that it was acting as a market maker 13 3 in the stock. In Chasins'
Rule lOb-5 suit for his losses in the stock, the Second Circuit held that
the omission was material.
The Court then addressed the causation issue:
To the extent that reliance is necessary for a finding of a I Ob-5 viola-
tion in a non-disclosure case such as this, the test is properly one of
tort 'causation in fact.' Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). Chasins relied upon Smith, Barney's recom-
mendations of purchase made without disclosure of a material fact,
purchased the securities recommended, and suffered a loss in their
resale. Causation in fact or adequate reliance was sufficiently shown
by Chasins.134
Understanding this passage is a key to understanding Affiliated Utle,
since the Supreme Court cites Chasins in the most crucial stage of its
treatment of causation.'35 The first sentence quoted is easy to accept.
This is the Court's earlier conclusion in List. Oddly enough, however,
132. 438 F.2d at 1167.
133. In the Court's words this meant that Smith, Barney "was maintaining a position in the
stocks on its own account by participating in over-the-counter trading in them." Id at 1170. The
Court quoted LOESER, THE OVER THE COUNTER SECURITIES MARKET WHAT IT IS AND How IT
OPERATES, 5-6 (1940):
A dealer engages in 'creating and maintaining a market' for securities. lIt] 'creates a
market for a security' when it is prepared both to buy and sell that security at the price it
quotes, and it 'maintains' such a market when it continues over a period to quote the
prices at which it is ready to buy and sell.
LOESER, supra, at 5-6;see also FED. SEC. CODE §202(91) (Proposed Official Draft 1978) (definition
of "marketmaker") and SEC Rule 17a-9(f)(1), 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-9 (1980).
134. 438 F.2d at 1172.
135. 406 U.S. at 154.
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Crane is cited and List is not. Crane certainly held that causation in
fact is the issue and not reliance, but it did so in a very different con-
text, when reliance was impossible. Anyway, the sentence is sensible,
though it is somewhat misstated. The Court should have said more
accurately that reliance need not be proved in lOb-5 actions if causa-
tion in fact can be established directly. Reliance itself is just a way of
showing causation in fact, reliance cannot be established by proof of
causation in fact.
If the Court were to be consistent with List (which it completely ig-
nores) it would now determine whether or not Chasins would have
bought the stock if the fact of Smith, Barney's market making had been
disclosed. However, the Court does not so- determine. "Chasins relied
upon Smith, Barney's recommendations of purchase made without the
disclosure of a material fact. . . and suffered a loss. . . . Causation
in fact or adequate reliance was sufficiently shown .... ,136
In other words, causation in fact was shown by Chasins' reliance on
the recommendations made without the disclosure of a material fact.
The Court focuses not on causation by the omission itself, but on cau-
sation by the recommendations and omission, that is, all of defendant's
conduct. To conclude that causation in fact is established the Court is
not concluding that without the omission there would have been no
sale, but rather, without Smith, Barney's "total conduct" there would
have been no sale. The former would have necessitated a List analysis
which does not appear. The latter is obvious.
The Court treats the recommendations with an omission of material
fact precisely as if the total conduct was one misrepresentation. Cha-
sins relied on the conduct, therefore causation is established. Thus, the
Second Circuit has adopted what is described above as the General
Reliance test. That is, Chasins generally relied on Smith, Barney,
therefore, specific reliance on the omission is not required to be proved
to establish the requisite causal element.
It is curious that the same court decided List and Chasins, espousing
very different standards for reliance on an omission. However, the two
cases can be explained consistently with the assumption that the Gen-
eral Reliance test does not establish causation conclusively, but merely
raises a rebuttable presumption of it. That is, general reliance on the
conduct of the defendant raises apresumption of specific reliance on the
material omission. This presumption could be rebutted by proof that
the omission by itself did not cause the transaction to take place using
the List standard. Since the List opinion found no reliance and Cha-
136. 438 F.2d at 1172 (emphasis added).
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sins did find reliance, this theory is consistent with both cases. It is not,
however, necessarily required by the language in either case. That is,
there was no mention of a "presumption" in either case.
This rebuttable presumption removes what might be thought of as a
flaw from the General Reliance Theory. If it is possible under the the-
ory to have nonreliance under the List test (actual noncausation) while
having causation under the General Reliance Theory, it seems that the
List test is better. The presumption solves this problem.
An examination of the role of materiality in the Chasins analysis of
causation is necessary before one can understand Affiliated Ute.
Though materiality is evidence of reliance and hence causation, in the
quoted passage materiality is used only to show that there was a viola-
tion of Rule lOb-5, the omission of a material fact, not in any sense to
imply causation. That is, the Court stresses that Chasins relied on rec-
ommendations without the disclosure of a material fact. His general
reliance establishes (perhaps only presumptively) causation. The mate-
riality only establishes a violation of Rule lOb-5. So his entering into
the transaction was caused by a violation of the nile. It is crucial to
notice that under the Court's analysis, there would have been no less
causation if the omitted fact had not been material; there just would
have been no violation of the rule. The court in no way uses materiality
to imply that Chasins would have acted differently if the fact had been
disclosed. This is irrelevant to the Court's analysis of causation. It is
enough for the Court that Chasins would not have entered into the
transaction without his general reliance.
Materiality may play an additional role in the Court's discussion of
causation, though the following theory is not explicitly supported by
the language. Materiality not only establishes a violation of the rule, it
establishes a violation of the rule that is important enough so that its
"punishment" will further the interests of the rule.137 This, of course, is
the purpose of materiality-to insure that only "important" violations
are remedied by the law.
Given a nondisclosure of a material fact, it is in furtherance of the
deterrent purposes of the rule to impose liability on the defendant.
1 38
Therefore, it makes sense to weaken the causal requirement by only
137. This theory is explicitly stated in Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970)
and discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 145-150 infra.
138. See 396 U.S. at 384. The materiality requirement
adequately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be established by
proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for which approval is
sought, that correction of the defect or imposition of liability would not further the inter-
ests protected by Sec. 14(a).
Id
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requiring general reliance instead of specific reliance or, more ele-
gantly, specific reliance from general reliance, thus shifting the burden
on the causation issue to the defendant, upon proof of general reliance.
Stated simply, the theory is that materiality establishes that the defend-
ant committed a "bad act." Since society has an interest in deterring
"bad acts," the causal requirement is softened to general reliance or the
burden of proof is shifted upon proof of general reliance. This theory
is used by the Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co. 139, a
case very similar to Chasins. Mills will be discussed more fully below.
Another significant theory in this area is based on the List test and so
is quite different from General Reliance. This theory, that of "Implied
Reliance" is not present in the reasoning of Chasins. It is useful, how-
ever, to consider it in the Chasins context to provide a basis for under-
standing its supposed application in Mills and Affiliated Ute.
The basic Implied Reliance Theory is simple. Materiality of an
omission means that a reasonable man would have found the omitted
fact was important in making his decision. Therefore, once materiality
is established, plaintiff really only needs to show he would have acted
reasonably to show causation in fact under the List test.'4 ° This small
assumption of reasonableness thus implies a presumption of causation
from materiality. This small assumption can be justified by the other-
wise difficult proof of reliance on an omission. To meet the List test
plaintiff must show that he would have acted in a certain way in a
hypothetical situation, i.e., if the omitted facts had been disclosed to
him. This proof is difficult in two ways. First, the plaintiff may have
trouble convincing the fact finder of his reactions to a hypothetical situ-
ation.14' Second, the value of such hypothetical proof may be only of
doubtful worth. 1 42 Therefore, since it has already been shown that the
defendant violated the rule, the small assumption should be made to
help the plaintiff.143 This would then raise a presumption of reliance or
causation in fact from materiality. A refinement of the theory suggests
that the presumption should only be rebuttable.'" This "presumption"
might be why the causal requirement is relaxed in Chasins.
This theory gained great acceptance as an explanation of Affiliated
Ute and Mills. 14 It does not, however, accurately describe the reason-
139. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
140. See note 121 supra.
141. 3 BROMBERG & LoWNEFELS, supra note 2, §8.6, at 209-11.
142. 3 BROMBERG & LOWNEFELS, supra note 2, §8.6, at 209-11; Note, The Reliance Require-
ment in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule lob-5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584, 590 (1975).
143. Other reasons such as the large number of voters in a proxy contest may be given in
special circumstances. See 396 U.S. at 385.
144. 3 BROMBERG & LOwNEFELS, supra note 2, §8.6, at 212.
145. See note 153 infra.
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ing in Chasins. The court in Chasins gives no indication that material-
ity might justify a presumption of reliance. There is, in fact, no such
presumption. The court still requires proof of reliance on the total con-
duct of the defendant. In addition, this theory is so revolutionary in
nature that it is hard to believe that the court would use it without any
discussion.
A final note on this introduction to General Reliance and Implied
Reliance is in order: given a situation where general causation or reli-
ance is obvious, as in most direct dealing situations, the basic causal
link is already established. Thus, causation is established if the Gen-
eral Reliance Theory applies. But the theory applies whenever there is
an omission of a material fact. Therefore, given a situation in which
there is general reliance and an omission, the only remaining proof
necessary to establish causation is materiality. In this sense then, given
general reliance and an omission, materiality establishes causation in
fact (though perhaps only presumptively). Therefore, where these ele-
ments are present the implication of causation from materiality under
the General Causation Theory is very like that of the Implied Reliance
Theory. In fact, wherever there is general reliance e.g., in most direct
dealing situations, the theories give the same result. Where there is no
general reliance, however, the opposite result occurs.
Even though the two theories give similar results in most cases, they
are theoretically very different. The Implied Reliance Theory implies
reliance from materiality. So, in a sense, causation does not have to be
shown for this theory, only materiality does. The General Reliance
Theory, though it may appear to require only a material omission in
situations of general reliance, still requires proof of a causal connec-
tion, general reliance itself.
The Chasins opinion is of great importance in the analysis that fol-
lows. It is therefore important to keep in mind the holding and reason-
ing of the case. Chasins is a clear example of the General Reliance
Theory; it contains no reference to the ideas of Implied Reliance.
d The Mills Case
In 1970, shortly before the decision in Chasins, the Supreme Court
decided a quite similar case in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 146 These
two cases normally are thought to form the basis for the Affiliated Ute
decision. Defendants in the Mills case made a material omission in a
proxy statement which called for approval of a merger. Plaintiff sued
146. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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under Rule 14a-9' 47 after the merger was approved, claiming to be in-
jured because the terms of the merger were unfavorable. The crucial
issue in the case was that of causation, whether or not the omission
caused the merger to be approved. The Supreme Court held that plain-
tiff did not have to prove that individuals voting a certain number of
shares "relied" on the omissions. The Court noted that the materiality
requirement embodies
a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might
have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who
was in the process of deciding how to vote. This requirement that the
defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process is
found in the express terms of Rule 14a-9 and it adequately serves the
purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be established by
proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for
which approval is sought, that correction of the defect or imposition
of liability would not further the interests protected by §14(a).148
Having decided that imposition of liability would further the purposes
of Section 14(a), the Court imposed a low causal standard:
There is no need to supplement this requirement. . . with a require-
ment of proof of whether the defect actually had a decisive effect on
the voting. Where there has been a finding of materiality, a share-
holder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between
the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress, if, as here, he
proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular de-
fect, . . was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transac-
tion. This objective test will avoid the impracticalities of
determining how many votes were affected, and, by resolving doubts
in favor of those the statute is designed to protect, will effectuate the
congressional policy of ensuring that the shareholders are able to
make an informed choice when they are consulted on corporate
transactions. 149
The Court's reasoning in this case is the same as that of the General
Reliance Theory of Chasins. Given materiality, the Court requires
only general reliance, i.e., that the proxy statement itself was a cause in
fact of the transaction. In addition, the court affirms the role of materi-
ality in the General Reliance Theory proposed in the discussion of Cha-
sins."' Just as in Chasins the Court never tries to determine whether
the omission itself caused the transaction. The Court does not even
147. SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9 (1980) (promulgated under §14(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.SC. §78n(a) (1976)), prohibits fraud in the solicitation of proxies.
Though Mills was not a Rule lOb-5 case, the rules are similar and the reasoning of the cases seems
applicable to Rule 10b-5 situations.
148. 396 U.S. at 38 (footnotes omitted).
149. Id at 384-85 (citations omitted).
150. See text accompanying notes 137-138 supra.
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mention the List test. Instead the Court decides, exactly as in Chasins,
that, given a material omission, the causal connection to be established
is not between the omission and the transaction, but between the whole
proxy statement (the "total conduct") and the transaction: "Where
there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a suffi-
cient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the in-
jury. . . if, as here, he proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather
than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction."' 51
Unlike the Second Circuit in Chasins, the Supreme Court discusses
its justification for this result. The Court notes that materiality means
that the omitted fact was such that it might have been considered im-
portant by a reasonable shareholder. The conclusion from this obser-
vation is that the omission fit the Rule 14a-9 requirement that the
defect have a "significant propensity to affect the voting process." This
requirement "adequately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of
action cannot be established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unre-
lated to the transaction for which approval is sought, that correction of
the defect or imposition of a liability would not further the interests
protected by Section 14(a).' s2 In other words, at this point the Court
has decided that the omission was important enough to violate the rule
and that correction of, or liability from, such an important violation
would further the interests of the rule.
To this point, the Court mirrors the Chasins theory. Having decided
the omission merited correction or liability, the Court found it easy to
lower the causal standard to allow proof of only reliance on the "total
conduct," the proxy statement. Thus, under this analysis, the Supreme
Court appears to have followed the General Reliance Theory exactly.
An additional reason for the lower causal standard in Mills is given
by the Court:
This objective test will avoid the impracticalities of determining how
many votes were affected, and, by resolving doubts in favor of those
the statute is designed to protect, will effectuate the congressional
policy of ensuring that the shareholders are able to make an in-
formed choice when they are consulted on corporate transactions.' 53
This additional reason for easing the plaintiff's burden is in accord with
the ideas of the General Reliance Theory, that, given general reliance,
the causal connection should be presumed.
Unfortunately, the Mills case has been interpreted as a manifestation
151. 396 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
152. Id at 384.
153. Id
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of the Implied Reliance Theory proposed for Chasins. These inter-
pretations flatly claim that the case says that materiality establishes a
presumption of reliance.154 They rationalize this result by the difficulty
of proof of individual reliance by large numbers of shareholders, the
difficulty of proof by a reliance on an omission, and the small distance
between reliance and materiality. This is a nice theory, but just as in
Chasins it is not supported by the language of the case. The Court does
not speak of any "presumption of reliance" except in the context of
general reliance. Proof that the proxy materials were an "essential
link," i.e., a cause in fact, of the transaction is the crucial requirement
of the holding. The Court's discussion of materiality only leads to the
conclusion the omission was of the type rightly "punished" by the rule.
This discussion says nothing at all about any implication of reliance
from materiality through the List standard. Given that the General
Reliance Theory is so strongly supported by the language, this Implied
Reliance Theory is untenable. Yet, it is the accepted interpretation of
Mills.
The two theories clash again in the interpretation of Affiliated Ute.
Unfortunately, the opinion in that case is so unclear that it is impossi-
ble to determine the role of materiality in the context of causation.
Since the Affiliated Ute case is apparently based on Mills and Chasins,
however, the role of the General Reliance Theory in these cases indi-
cates that the correct interpretation of Affiliated Ute is one based on
that theory.
3. Affiliated Ute
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,'55 plaintiffs Ute Indians
were solicited by a bank and its employees to sell stock in their native
corporation. When the Indians did sell the stock the purchasers did not
disclose to the unsophisticated sellers that they were promoting another
market for the stock and selling it for a higher price. Unable to show
that they relied on the fraudulent nondisclosures, the plaintiffs failed to
154. See, ag., Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th Cir. 1976); Chelsea Assoc. v. Repanos, 527 F.2d
1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975). These are just examples. Practically every case citing Utle could servejust as well. Explanations of the purpose of the presumption vary: to alleviate plaintiffs diffi-
culty-Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980); Adato v. Kagan, 599 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir.
1979); Titan Group, Inc. v. Fagen, 513 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975); for conceptual difficulties-527 F.2d at 1271; Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975); large number of plaintiffl-Chrst-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341,
375 (2d Cir. 1973); express proof of reliance on omission "obvious[ly]" impossible-Cronin v.
Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980); accord, Sharp v. Coopers E.
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
155. 406 U.S. 128 (1977).
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prevail in their lOb-5 claim for damages in the Tenth Circuit. 15 6 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Tenth Circuit, hold-
ing for the plaintiffs.
The Court first decided that given the bank's solicitation of the plain-
tiffs, there was an obligation to disclose their market making activi-
ties. 157 The Court then turned to the issue of causation:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.
All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense
that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in
the making of this decision. See Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 384 (1970), SEC v. Texas GufSulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
849 (CA2 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3876-3880 (1969 Supp. to 2d
ed. of Vol. 3); A. Bromberg, Securities Law, Fraud-SEC Rule lOb-5,
§§2.6 and 8.6 (1967). This obligation to disclose and this withholding
of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. 158
The holding of the Court is clear. In certain circumstances, materiality
will "establish" causation in fact. To determine the scope of this result,
the motivations for it must be understood. Unfortunately, this para-
graph raises difficult problems of interpretation. It is very hard to de-
cide exactly what the Court means, or even how its conclusions follow
from its premises. Since no explanation is given for these conclusions,
it is necessary to turn to the authority cited for each step to attempt to
understand what motivated the decision. This study indicates that the
decision is dependent on the Chasns-Mills General Reliance Theory
and thus should be limited in its application to situations where general
reliance is present.
As demonstrated below, the only case cited for the actual reasoning
of this case is Chasins. That is sensible. Chasins was correctly decided
and Affiliated Vte is, in every important aspect, identical to Chasins.
Both cases involve nondisclosure of a material fact (the defendant's
market making) by a defendant who solicited the plaintiffs dealings
(though in Chasins the plaintiff's purchase was solicited; in Affiliated
Ute the plaintiff's sale was solicited). In both cases, given the solicita-
tion, there was no question that the defendant's actions induced the
plaintiff to enter into the transaction. This is crucially important. In
both cases the defendant's "total actions" were clearly the cause in fact
of the plaintiffs entering the transactions. If the defendants had not
1032
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157. 406 U.S. at 153.
158. Id at 153-54.
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solicited the plaintiffs, no transaction would have taken place. Thus,
general reliance was obvious in each fact situation.
The real causation question, therefore, in both cases was: Given that
the defendant's "total conduct" was a cause in fact of the plaintifs
entering into the transaction, must the plaintiff additionally show that
the omission itself was also such a cause in fact?
The Chasins court, of course, concluded that as long as there was a
violation of the rule, as shown by the materiality of the omission, the
plaintiff did not have to meet the stricter causal standard (or at least
that there was a shift of the burden of proof). In Mills the Supreme
Court came to the same conclusion, though whether the "total con-
duct" caused the transaction remained to be proven.
In Mills, the need for the materiality requirement was emphasized by
the discussion indicating that as long as there was materiality it made
good sense to punish the defendant. 59 To follow this Chasins-Mills
theory, then, the Court merely had to find a violation of Rule lOb-5,
because the relaxed causal connection was already established. To do
this the Court need only find an obligation to disclose and the with-
holding of a material fact. This would establish causation under the
Chasins-Mills General Reliance Theory (or the presumption thereof).
This reasoning seems to fit the language ofAffiliated Vte reasonably
well. The Court first announces that in the circumstances of this case,
involving primarily nondisclosures, "positive" proof of reliance is not
necessary.16 ° This is certainly true according to Chasins if one inter-
prets "the circumstances of this case" to mean "where there was such a
close relationship that general reliance was clear" and reliance to mean
""reliance on the omission," which seems clearly to be what the Court
means (especially since reliance on the defendant's total conduct is
obvious).
The Court continues "[a]ll that is necessary is that the facts withheld
be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have consid-
ered them important in the making of this decision."16 For this propo-
sition the Court cites four authorities. It is not clear from the context
which proposition in the sentence is supported by the citations, either
"all that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material" or "material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them im-
portant in the making of this decision."
The first cite is to Mills at page 384. This part of Mills does not
159. 396 U.S. at 384.
160. 406 U.S. at 153.
161. Id at 153-54.
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address the causal issue (though a cite to pages 384-85 might have). It
is merely the definition of materiality. Consistently, the next cite, to
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,162 is only to a definition of materiality.
The third cite is to part of Professor Loss' treatise, Securities Regula-
tion. The cite is to four pages of the'Supplement to the Second Edition
of Volume Three. This cite is somewhat mysterious. Within these four
pages (a discussion of reliance) there are only three references to mate-
riality. One, on page 3879, is inapplicable. Thus, the cite must refer to
the two cites on page 3877.
Echoing the British habit of blurring reliance and materiality (see p.
1703 supra), a District Court has posed the historical question:
If a plaintiff does not rely on the data he was furnished, how can he
say that the undisclosed data was material or that the data he was
furnished was "in the light of the circumstances" misleading?
63
This cite gives no support for either of the two propositions in the
sentence. In particular, note that it gives no support to the notion im-
plying reliance from materiality. It is very odd that it was included.
An explanation for the proper role of the cite is given below.
16
The final cite may be meaningful. The cite is to Professor Brom-
berg's treatise, the relevant part of which may be (though in a three
page section this paragraph is the only applicable part); "Alternatively
reliance may be presumed from materiality. There is some judicial
acceptance of this view, and it makes sense; once the latter is shown,
the reasonably prudent investor would be expected to rely.'
'16 5
If the Court meant to make reference to this passage it could have
done so more clearly. At any rate this is an indication that Affiliated
Ute is a deviation from Chasns, an affirmation of the Implied Reliance
Theory as opposed to that of General Reliance. This will be discussed
more fully below.
The sentence itself does fit nicely into the General Reliance Theory.
Since "general reliance" has been established, and an obligation to dis-
close already shown to be required, all that is needed is materiality to
fit the theory to establish causation in fact.
The Court concludes, "[t]his obligation to disclose and this withhold-
ing of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in
fact," citing Chans.1 66 Thus, Chasins is the only case cited for the
162. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. deniedsub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
163. 6 Loss, supra note 2, at 3877 (citing Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis.
1962), aft'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963)).
164. See text accompanying notes 168-169 infra.
165. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5, §8.6(2), at 212 (1967)
(footnotes omitted).
166. 406 U.S. at 154.
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reasoning 167 of the Court. The conclusion of course fits the General
Reliance Theory perfectly. Since Chasns stands only for the ideals of
the General Reliance Theory, that theory must be the correct interpre-
tation of the Affiliated Ute opinion.
Hpwever, the weak reference to Professor Bromberg may imply that
some notion of the Implied Reliance Theory is present in the opinion.
It seems very hard to accept, though, that the Court would base its
decision on this paragraph from Bromberg without a clearer reference
to it or discussion of this revolutionary idea. In addition, the final ref-
erence to Chasins is flatly contradictory to any suggestion that Affiliated
Ute uses the ideas of the Implied Reliance Theory. At any rate, the
Implied Reliance Theory has become the accepted theory of Affiliated
Ute. At this point it is hard to conclude that there is much more sup-
port for the theory in Affiliated Ute than there was in Mills or Chasins.
Fortunately, there is an additional clue to the analysis of Affiliated
Ute. The crucial passage in the case is so close to a passage in one of
the briefs in that case that it must have been copied from it. Fortu-
nately this "original" passage is much clearer than that in the Affiliated
Ute decision.
In the Brief for the United States and Brief for the Securities and
Exchange Commission as amicus curiae in Reyos1 61 the following pas-
sage occurs:
In addition, at least in the circumstances of this case where the mis-
conduct involves a failure to disclose material facts rather than the
making of affirmative statements that are false and misleading, proof
of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery; it is wholly conjectural
whether an investor would in fact have acted differently had he been
advised of all material facts. (See Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud-
S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, part 8.6, p. 209; 6 Loss, Securities Regulation
3878-3880 (1969). List v. Fashion Park, Inc. 340 F.2d 457 (C.A.2), is
not to the contrary.) In such situations, it is necessary only that the
facts withheld be "material"; that is, information a reasonable inves-
tor "might have ... considered important" in determining his
course of action. Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384;
see also Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d 833, 849, Certiorari denied sub. nom. Coates v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 394 U.S. 976. If the defendant owed an obli-
gation of disclosure, and if it is shown that "material" facts were
withheld, this proof suffices to establish the requisite element of cau-
sation in fact. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., supra, 438 F.2d at
167. The Mills and Texas Gulf cites are merely references to the definition of materiality.
168. Reyos was one of the actions amalgamated to make up the Affiliated Ute case. See note
155 supra. [This brief is hereinafter cited as Brief].
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1172 (footnote added to text).1 69
It is obvious that the Court's discussion is based on this passage from
the SEC brief. In fact, it is obvious that the quoted part of theAffiliated
Ute opinion is aparaphrase of this passage. Therefore, an analysis of
the reasoning in this passage should shed light on the reasoning inAffil-
iated Ute.
The first sentence may clear up an ambiguity of Affiliated Ute. "[I]n
the circumstances of this case" refers fairly explicitly here to omissions
as opposed to misrepresentations, not to the total circumstances of the
case. Of course, this does not mean that the circumstances do not affect
the decision.
Even more importantly this first sentence cites Professors Loss and
Bromberg, but for a much less controversial point than does the Affili-
ated Ute passage. In Affiliated Ule the cites are delayed until the next
sentence referring to materiality. Here, the authorities are cited for one
of two statements, either that proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery or that such proof is highly conjectural. The Loss cite here is
only to pages 3878-80. This section refers to causation as opposed to
reliance, advocating the former as the standard. It thus refers to both
proposed statements. The cited section, it should be noted, does not
relate to materiality; even the marginal cite in 3876-78 is omitted. The
Bromberg cite also discusses causation in place of reliance. Though the
materiality language quoted above is contained in the cite, nothing in
the SEC brief singles it out.
The net result is that neither authority in the SEC brief is seemingly
cited for the "materiality implies reliance" idea. The use of the Loss
cite makes sense in this context when it did not in the Court's opinion.
The logical conclusion is that both cites should be read to stand as they
do in the SEC brief, not the Court's opinion. This leaves the Implied
Reliance Theory with absolutely no support as an explanation for Affili-
ated Ute. The General Reliance Theory which fits the SEC language
well, must have been the basis for the opinion.
The next sentence is even more revealing. As noted above, the Mills
and Texas GulfSulphur cites refer only to the definition of materiality.
In the SEC brief the definition is quoted thus giving definite proof that
this definition is all that Mills is cited for. This important point helps
defeat the Implied Causation view-Mills is not cited to support that
idea, in fact no case is. 7°
169. Brief, supra note 168, at 66-67.
170. This is an important point because many courts which use the Implied Reliance Theory
for Ute do so because that is their interpretation of Mills also, and they think that ie cites Mills
for its reasoning. This discussion convincingly indicates, however, that Mills was not involved in
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The last sentence is again clearer than that of Affiliated Ute. The
"proof" that suffices to show causation is the "show[ing] that material
facts were withheld" given a duty to disclose. The duty to disclose does
not help prove causation, as might be inferred from Affiliated Ute, ma-
teriality does. Since only Chasins is cited for this proposition, the con-
clusion must be that Chasins is the basis for the reasoning. Chasins,
however, applies only to the General Reliance Theory and thus, since
the SEC brief has no reference to it, the conclusion follows that the
theory is an erroneous interpretation of the brief and hence the Affili-
ated Ute decision.
At this point it is worth re-examining the basic theoretical difference
between the two theories. The Implied Reliance Theory implies reli-
ance or causation from materiality. It is thus tantamount to the elimi-
nation of the causal requirement. The General Reliance Theory, on
the other hand, still requires proof of reliance, though not of specific
reliance. There is thus a fundamental difference in the two theories
and their approach to causation. Though they seem to agree where
general reliance is present, in its absence they give directly opposite
results.
4. Implied or General Reliance?
Though the conclusion is reached above that the General Reliance
Theory is the basis of the Affiliated Ute decision, this theory has not
been generally accepted. Instead the Implied Reliance Theory seems to
be the basis of most courts application of the Affiliated Ute holding. In
ordinary cases, however, the choice of theories is unimportant. In any
case involving general reliance the two theories apply Affiliated Ute in
the same way,' 7 ' requiring only a material omission to establish liabil-
ity if there is an obligation to disclose.
The reason for the failure of the General Reliance Theory to gain
acceptance is simple. The Affiliated Ute opinion is so confusingly writ-
ten that a good deal of thought is needed to understand its dependence
on Chasins. It is much easier to accept its literal holding without un-
derstanding the limitations on it imposed by its justification. The lit-
eral holding, of course, is "in a case of nondisclosures, an obligation to
disclose and materiality imply causation in fact." Though this holding
the court's reasoning, except as an example of the definition of materiality. See, eg., Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374-75 (2d Cir. 1973). Note, The Reliance Re-
quirement in PrivateActions Under SECRule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L. RPv. 584, 586 (1975). Of course,
even if Mills were cited for the "Materiality implies reliance" idea, it has been shown that Mills
endorses the idea only in thi context of general reliance.
171. But see text accompanying notes 219-221 infra.
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makes no sense 72 when read literally, it is easy to apply, and so has
been used.
A major reason for the acceptance of the Implied Reliance Theory is
that the one line holding of Affiliated Ute seems to support it. The
holding and theory reach the same conclusion, that materiality estab-
lishes causation in fact. In contrast, the General Reliance Theory is
stated quite differently-in the circumstances, involving general reli-
ance, specific reliance on the omission need not be proved if the omis-
sion is material. On the surface, this does not seem to agree with the
holding of Affiliated Ute, though the conclusion above is that it is the
true interpretation.
The reasoning of Affiliated (te is generally explained under the Im-
plied Reliance Theory in this way: the reasoning of Affiliated Vie is
indecipherable. Therefore, working back from the conclusion which
does make sense, one must replace "in the circumstances of this case"
with "in a case involving omissions" (note this is probably correct ac-
cording to the SEC brief) and ignore the obligation to disclose (this
becomes a "duty" question to be decided separately). Then replace
"causation in fact" with "reliance" and "establishes" with "establishes
a presumption of." Thus, the "holding" ofAffiliated Ute as interpreted
under the Implied Reliance Theory is "in cases involving nondisclo-
sures, materiality of the nondisclosed facts establishes a presumption of
reliance."' 73 This holding can "only" be explained, as discussed above,
by the difficulty of showing reliance on an omission and the closeness
of materiality to reliance. 74
It is obvious that this theory is highly artificial. It does not seem to
be supported by the language of the case at all. Yet, this is now the
accepted theory, and, as such, it is worth examination.
a. Application of the Implied Reliance Theory
Given that a court is to use the Implied Reliance Theory, it first must
determine the proper framework for its decision. This framework is
rot clearly given by the Affiliated Ule opinion. The first step a court
must take is to decide if the theory is to apply at all. This merely re-
quires a finding of omissions. Under the General Reliance Theory, of
course, much more is needed, especially in terms of the relationship
between the parties. In the Implied Reliance Theory, the relationship
between the parties is irrelevant.
172. A duty to disclose can have no effect on causation in fact, see text accompanying notes
175-176 infra.
173. See note 53 supra.
174. See note 153 supra.
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Upon a finding of omissions the Court must consider the Affiliated
Ute holding, which raises problems immediately. "This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite
element of causation in fact."' 75 This line is open to two quite different
interpretations. First, which appears to be more logical, it can be inter-
preted as "Given the withholding of a material fact, causation is in fact
established or presumed. Since there was also an obligation to disclose,
that is, a violation of a duty, the defendant is liable." This is quite a
stretching of the language of the Court, but it at least makes sense. It is,
in fact, in accord with the basic assumptions of the Implied Reliance
Theory. In its analysis of the presumption of reliance (causation) from
materiality there is no place for duty. Unfortunately, the clear lan-
guage of the Court must be quite twisted to get this result.
However, the literal reading of the statement seems to make no sense
at all under the Implied Reliance Theory (Of course, the General Reli-
ance Theory explains the statement nicely. In that theory, duty just
establishes a violation, it does not imply causation.). The literal read-
ing implies that an obligation to disclose helps to establish causation in
fact. Clearly an obligation cannot cause anything and it is hard to see
how it could help prove that there was causation in fact. An argument
may be made that both the obligation to disclose and materiality help
show that the plaintiff actually relied on the nondisclosure and hence
there was causation in fact. It is easy to see why materiality indicates
reliance, that requires only the assumption that the plaintiff is a reason-
able man. Conceivably, the obligation to disclose may indicate that
there is a somewhat "close" that is, face to face, relationship between
the parties and thus that the plaintiff was more likely to rely on the
nondisclosure or that the plaintiff, aware of the duty, expected disclo-
sure. 176 These explanations seem very weak. 1
77
The clear language of the court, that there must be a duty to disclose
information before a nondisclosure is a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's ac-
tion, is utterly, unarguably wrong. Causation in fact is and must be
totally separate from any idea of duty. Therefore, most courts using
the Implied Reliance Theory brush over this difficulty and treat the
175. 406 U.S. at 54.
176. In the common law, two types of nondisclosures are actionable because of the duty be-
tween the parties, the case of fiduciary duty and the case of plaintiffs expectation of disclosure of
facts basic to the transaction due to the customs of the trade. In both these situations, plaintiff
may be said to rely on the "duty." However, this is not really true. The plaintiff actually is relying
on this relationship with the defendant not on any legal "duty." In any case, this reliance is a case
of "general reliance," so the Implied Reliance Theory is not needed to imply causation.
177. The SEC Brief presents its final sentence in such a way as to avoid controversy. "If the
defendant owed an obligation of disclosure, and it is shown that "material facts" were withheld,
this proof suffices to establish the requisite element of causation in fact." Brief, supra note 167, at
67.
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duty requirement as a separate one from causation in fact. That is,
materiality implies causation in fact but duty is also needed before lia-
bility. This makes sense in practice, if not as an interpretation of Affli-
ated Ute.178
The framework for analysis of the Implied Reliance Theory, then is:
first the court must determine if there are omissions; second, it must
decide if the omissions are material, thus implying causation in fact;
and finally, it must decide if there is a duty to disclose in the circum-
stances such that the defendant should be liable for plaintiffs losses.
Several decisions which follow Affiliated Ute have difficulty with this
framework.' 79
b. Simon v. Merrill Lynch
One of the first cases to interpret Affiliated Ute rejected the Implied
Reliance Theory in favor of the General Reliance Theory. In Simon v.
Merrill Lynch,' plaintiff customer brought a Rule lOb-5 suit against
his broker, charging that Merrill Lynch knew of the precarious
financial position of a company, but continued to recommend its stock
up to the time plaintiff had bought the stock without relying on any
misrepresentations made by the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff ar-
gued that, since the defendant had a duty to disclose the information to
him and had withheld that material information, proof of reliance was
not necessary under Affiliated Ute.
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument:
We think the finding that plaintiff did not generally rely upon the
broker for advice makes the principle asserted by Simon inapplicable
here. Although Ute does state that a plaintiff need not specifically
demonstrate reliance on particular omissions, that case did not in-
volve, as here, a general lack of reliance by the plaintiff on the de-
fendants' representation. In Ue, concerning the management and
distribution of the Indian tribe's assets, the Court acknowledged that
the plaintiffs 'considered these defendants to be familiar with the
market for the shares of stock and relied upon them when they de-
sired to sell their shares'. . . . The Court made clear that 'if [defend-
ants] had functioned merely as a transfer agent, there would have
been no duty of disclosure here.' . . . [S]ome element of general
reliance by plaintiff, even in nondisclosure cases is essential to a Rule
10b-5 action.... Simon made his own investment decisions and
relied in no way on defendant's recommendations. The ... require-
ment of reasonable reliance, therefore, was not met. Nor does Cha-
178. See text accompanying notes 128-131 supra.
179. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
180. 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973).
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sins, supra, provide him with support because the Second Circuit
limited that opinion to the fact situation where the defendant 'had
strongly recommended sales of [plaintiffs] holdings and purchases of
• ..stocks in which [defendant] was dealing as a principal' and the
plaintiff relied upon defendant's recommendations of the purchase.
(footnotes and citations omitted).181
The Court thus distinguished4ffiliated Ute and Chasins and applied
the General Reliance Theory." 2 After rejecting Affiliated Ute, the
Fifth Circuit also tacitly rejected List. Since knowledge of the precari-
ous financial position of the company would almost certainly have pre-
vented Simon from buying the stock, the List test of causation from a
nondisclosure would have been satisfied. The Simon court disagrees
with this standard as a test of causation. "[S]ome element of general
reliance by plaintiff, even in nondisclosure cases, is essential to a Rule
lOb-5 action."1 3 Thus, the Court rejects the whole notion of reliance
on a nondisclosure, limiting recovery to cases of actual reliance on
some action, not merely a nondisclosure.
c. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch
In the next major case construing Affiliated Ute the Second Circuit
reached an opposite result of that of Simon. In Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch,"s4 the defendant brokerage firm obtained adverse inside infor-
mation from the Douglas Aircraft Company for which it was to under-
write an issue of debentures. The defendant "tipped" this information
to some of its institutional customers but did not trade on the basis of
the information itself. These customers sold their stock (some even
made short sales) on the basis of the "tip." Plaintiff, without any
knowledge of defendant's activities, bought stock during the time the
"tippees" were selling. The Second Circuit, in denying defendant's
motion for judgement on the pleadings, held that the defendant had a
duty to the plaintiff to disclose the information and that the necessary
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
harm was established.
The Court began by dividing its analysis into two parts: first, was
there a violation of Rule lOb-5, and, second, if so, should the defend-
ants be liable to the plaintiffs for damages? Considering the violation
181. Id at 884-85 (footnotes and citations omitted).
182. The Simon case represents only part of the General Reliance Theory, the negative half.
That is, the court holds that no reliance on an omission exists in the absence of general reliance.
Simon says nothing about establishing causation from proof of general reliance. Chasins and
Mills are needed for that, the positive half of the theory. See note 124 supra.
183. 482 F.2d at 884.
184. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
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question in the light of its earlier decision in SEC v. Texas Guf
Sulphur, the Court quoted, "anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is
disabled from disclosing it. . ., must abstain from trading in or recom-
mending the securities concerned while such inside information re-
mains undisclosed.""';
Thus disposed to find a violation, the Court turned to the defendant's
argument that Texas Guf Sulphur was inapplicable because it was an
SEC injunction action, not a suit for private damages. The Court
found that the same policy applied in this case. It concluded,
[d]efendant's owed a duty-for the breach of which they may be held
liable in this private action for damages-not only to the purchasers
of the actual shares sold by defendant ... but to all persons who
during the same period purchased Douglas stock on the open market
without knowledge of the material inside information which was in
the possession of defendants.
186
Having thus found a violation of Rule lOb-5, the Court addressed
the remaining question of whether the defendant should be liable to the
plaintiff for damages. As is clear in the analysis of the duty question,
the Court felt that there should be liability. All that remained to be
shown was causation.
The defendants argued along the lines of the General Reliance The-
ory that
it was Douglas' precarious financial condition, not defendant's secur-
ities law violations, which precipitated the sudden, substantial drop
in the market price of Douglas stock and hence the losses sustained
by plaintiffs; that, since plaintiffs had no prior or contemporaneous
knowledge of defendant's actions, they would have purchased Doug-
las stock regardless of defendant's securities law violations, and that,
since defendant's sales were unrelated to plaintiffs purchases and all
transactions took place on anonymous public stock exchanges, there
is lacking the requisite connection between defendant's alleged viola-
tions and the alleged losses sustained by plaintiffs."8 7
The Couri rejected this argument, stating briefly that on the author-
ity of 4ffiliated Ute, "the requisite element of causation in fact has been
established by the uncontroverted facts that defendants traded in or
recommended trading in Douglas stock without disclosing material in-
side information which plaintiffs as reasonable investors might have
considered important in making their decision to purchase Douglas
185. Id at 236, citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (1968).
186. Id at 237.
187. Id at 238.
1042
1982 / Private Actions Under SEC Rule lob-3
stock." 188
"Backing up a bit" from its Affiliated Ute conclusion the Court re-
viewed the pre-Affiliated Ute law and decided that the same end point
is reached.
[T]he proper test to determine whether causation in fact has been
established in a non-disclosure case is 'whether the plaintiff would
have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defend-
ant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact' List. . ., Chasins...
[T]he Rule lOb-5 causation in fact requirement is satisfied by plain-
tiff's allegation that they would not have purchased Douglas stock if
they had known of the information withheld by defendants.'8 9
The Court then returned to Affiliated Ute and emphasized that it
controlled in this case. It held that, under the Affiliated Ute case, "the
requisite elements of causation in fact has been established by the ad-
mitted withholding of defendants of material inside information which
they were under an obligation to disclose, such information being
clearly material . *"... 9 The Court then rejected the defendant's
General Reliance argument, holding that Affiliated Ute should not be
restricted to its facts "which involved face-to-face transactions."' 19' In-
stead, the Court held that the Affiliated Ute rule was not dependent
upon the relationship of the parties, but rather "upon whether the de-
fendant is obligated to disclose the inside information."' 92
A synopsis of the Court's reasoning is that (a) there was a duty to
disclose in these circumstances, (b) since the plaintiffs pleadings must
be accepted as true and the plaintiff claimed causation in fact under the
List standard, causation in fact is established under pre-Affiliated Ute
law, and (c) there is no need to refer to prior law since under Affiliated
Ute the duty to disclose and the withholding of a material fact establish
causation in fact. The Court thus interprets Affiliated Ute in accord
with the Implied Reliance Theory, that somehow a duty to disclose and
the withholding of a material fact "establish" causation in fact. In ap-
plying the Implied Reliance Theory, the Shapiro court is constrained
only to follow the nonsensical "duty" language of Affiliated Ute, as a
part of the causation issue.
The Second Circuit properly determined that there was a duty to
disclose, such that nondisclosure would justify holding the defendants
liable for plaintiffs damages. Though its conclusion may be debated,
188. Id
189. Id at 239-40.
190. Id at 240.
191. Id The General Reliance Theory presumption is, of course, not limited to face-to-face
transactions, but to ones where general reliance is present.
192. Id
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its analysis is proper under either the Implied Reliance or General Re-
liance Theory. The Court then turns to the issue of causation. The List
test is clearly satisfied, as the plaintiff merely pleaded causation in fact
under it. The Court, however, was not satisfied with this simple dispo-
sal of the issue. The impression from the opinion is that the Court was
somewhat hesitant to rely on the List test in the open market setting.
As discussed above, 193 though the List test is logically independent of
the relationship between the parties, its application in cases not involv-
ing a context of personal dealings results in practically everyone in the
whole world being a cause in fact of the harm.
So, perhaps to justify causation in the open market setting, the Court
relied on the Affiliated Ute decision for its holding.1 94 Under the Im-
plied Reliance Theory all that is needed is a finding of a material omis-
sion. The question of duqy under this theory is irrelevant to a finding of
causation in fact, as, of course, it must be. However, the Shapiro court,
perhaps only to meet the literal language of the Affiliated Ute standard,
clearly indicated that "duty" was an integral part of its causation analy-
sis. Aside from this flaw, the Shapiro decision was a correct application
of the Implied Reliance Theory.
The General Reliance Theory would have led to a much different
result in Shapiro. There was no "general reliance" in the Shapiro case.
Under the General Reliance Theory, Affiliated Ute is inapplicable. The
Court then might have turned to List, the pre-Affihated Ute standard of
causation. Shapiro then would have been the real test of the List stan-
dard. If List were applied, as it logically might have been, the causa-
tion in fact standard would have been so broad as to be no limitation at
all. However, the focus then would have been on duty in the imper-
sonal setting, which is probably the correct question to decide liability
in this situation.' 5 The true General Reliance Theory, as exemplified
in Simon, would reject the List test after rejecting the application of
Affiliated Ute. Since there was no general reliance by plaintiff there
was no causation in fact. A broader analysis of the problem of causa-
tion in the open market context is given below.
d Fridrich v. Bradford
The Shapiro analysis was sharply criticized by the Sixth Circuit in
Fridrich v. Bradford in 1976.' 9 6 Applying the General Reliance Theory,
193. See text accompanying notes 121-123 supra.
194. Of course, if this was the reason for the Court's reliance on Ute, it was mistaken. The
Implied Reliance Theory is dependent on the List test to justify the presumption. See text accom-
panying notes 139-143 supra.
195. See text accompanying notes 227-230 infra.
196. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
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the Fridrich Court held that Affiliated Ute was applicable in the open
market setting. The Court found that there was no causation in trading
on inside information in the impersonal market since the market trad-
ers actions were not influenced by the insiders trading.
The Court reasoned that, since the "disclose or abstain" rule of Texas
GulfSul.phur allows an insider not to disclose information,
[i]nvestors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open
market without complete or always accurate information. Defend-
ant's trading did not alter plaintiff's expectations when they sold their
stock, and in no way influenced plaintiff's trading decision ...
[T]herefore the defendant's act of trading with third persons was not
causally connected with any claimed loss by plaintiffs who traded on
the impersonal market and who were otherwise unaffected by the
wrongful acts of insiders.' 97
The Court then turned to Affiliated Ute. Plainly endorsing the Gen-
eral Reliance Theory, Judge Engel wrote:
We are unable to construe the language [relied on by the Second
Circuit in Shapiro]... so broadly. It was shown in Affiliated Ute
that the defendant bank employees had .engaged in prior business
dealings with the plaintiff Indians. [footnote: It seems clear that be-
cause of their prior business dealings with plaintiffs, defendants in
Affiliated Ute owed a duty of disclosure to them .... ] They en-
tered into a deliberate scheme to induce the plaintiffs to sell their
stock without disclosure of material facts which would have influ-
enced the decision to sell. The resulting sales were a direct result of
the scheme. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Supreme Court
concluded that "[U]nder the circumstances of this case,. . ., all that
was necessary was that the information withheld be material in order
to establish the requisite causation.
198
The Court justified this reading of Affiliated Ute by noting its refer-
ence to Chasins, in the same way in which the General Reliance The-
ory was developed.199 Judge Engel concluded:
Here, unlike Affiliated Ute, defendants did not perpetrate any scheme
to induce defendants to sell their stock. Plaintiffs and defendants
here had no relationship whatever during the period in question.
The plaintiffs in Affiliated Ute had a right to expect that the defend-
ant bank officials would fully disclose all material information con-
cerning the stock while inducing them to sell. When defendants did
not make full disclosure, they breached Rule lOb-5 and became lia-
ble for plaintiffs foreseeable damages. The type of relationship ex-
197. Id at 318-19 (footnotes omitted).
198. Id at 319.
199. Id
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isting between plaintiffs and defendants is totally absent here.200
The Fridrich opinion gives both a clear explanation of the General
Reliance Theory and a correct application of it. By looking at the basis
of the Affiliated Ute decision the Court is able to understand its limits,
in contrast to the Shapiro court, which only reads the Affiliated Ute
conclusion mechanically.
The Fridrich court, however, like Simon, failed to mention the List
causation standard once Affiliated Ute was rejected as irrelevant. It is
crystal clear that the nondisclosures in Fridrich meet the List stan-
dard-if the plaintiff had had the information disclosed to him he
would have acted differently. Thus, the Court might have discussed the
reach of the List decision. Instead, List is not even mentioned. The
court merely holds that the defendant's actions (as opposed to his non-
disclosures) did not cause the plaintiffs to enter into the transaction.
This is tantamount to holding that nondisclosures are not actionable in
any impersonal situation. The tension between List and Shapiro and
the General Reliance Theory is addressed more fully below, in the dis-
cussion of the open market.
5. The Affiliated Ute Presumption in the Lower Courts
The Affiliated Utle holding leaves open two questions 0 1 which have
been the subject of much controversy: (1) Is the presumption to be
limited to cases of omissions? and (2) Is the presumption rebuttable?
The lower courts are in substantial agreement that the presumption
should not apply to misrepresentations, and that, when it applies, it
should be rebuttable. Before addressing those questions, a review of
the purposes of the presumption under the two theories is in order. The
Implied Reliance Theory understandsAffiliated Ute's purpose in apply-
ing the presumption as one to both help alleviate the plaintiffs difficult
burden in proving reliance on an omission and to avoid problems in-
herent in the dubious value of such proof.2 02 The General Reliance
Theory contains these purposes but also recognizes another, a sort of
punishment-deterrent motive in the nondisclosure situation." 3
a. Should the Presumption Apply Only to the Case of
Nondisclosures?
An analysis of the presumption leads to the conclusion, that, under
200. Id at 320.
201. The presumption has also been used to facilitate class actions by replacing the individual
reliance requirement with the "common question" of materiality. See Cameron v. Adams & Co.,
547 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1976). This questionable use of Utle is beyond the scope of this article.
202. See text accompanying notes 139-142 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 136-138 supra.
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the Implied Reliance Theory, it should be confined to nondisclosures;
affirmative misrepresentations and half truths should not be affected by
the Affiliated Ute doctrine. The General Reliance Theory does not re-
quire this result, but it is not inconsistent with it. The lower courts
have, for the most part, adopted this view of Affiliated Ute.
In the case of an affirmative misrepresentation, there is no special
difficulty in proving reliance. The plaintiff avers that he relied, the de-
fendant denies it and the factflnder decides. This seems to work well in
common law fraud cases and there seems to be no reason to change it
here. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute indicated that the
presumption should not apply to misrepresentations. "Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, involvingprimarily afailure to disclose, positive
proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.'20
4
A more difficult problem is presented by the case of the half truth. A
half truth may be defined as a statement that is true by itself, but which
has misleading implications if certain facts are not disclosed.20 5 To
prove reliance on a half truth the plaintiff cannot merely show that he
believed the statements actually made. Those are presumably true. He
really must show that he acted on the belief that the nondisclosed facts
were not true. However, this does not present the same proof problems
as in the nondisclosure case.
Since the original statements were misleading because of the omis-
sions, the nonexistence of the omitted facts can be reasonably assumed
from the statements. Thus, the half truth is very much like a statement
to the effect that the true part is true and that the reasonable assump-
tions following from it are true. The plaintiff can claim he believed the
original statement to be true and thus believed the assumptions to be
true.20 6 Thus, just as in the case of an actual misrepresentation, the
plaintiff can show he believed something and acted on that belief. The
factfnder then has no theoretical problems in deciding whether or not
there was reliance.
The difference between this case and that of a nondisclosure is that
the plaintiff in the half truth case has a basis (the half truth) for forming
a belief in the nonexistence of the omitted facts. Thus, he can plead he
believed in their nonexistence. In other words he can plead he believed
in the half truth-not in the restrictive way in which it is true, but in the
literal way to be expected in its context, in which by definition it is
false. Plaintiff needs no special help to prove this. Thus, under the
Implied Reliance Theory, no presumption should apply.
204. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (emphasis added).
205. REsTATEMENT, supra note 16, at §551(2)(a).
206. This is the situation in common law fraud. See note 27 supra.
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In contrast, in the case of the nondisclosure, the plaintiff normally
has no basis for a belief in the nonexistence of th6 nondisclosed facts.
Normally, the nondisclosure would be of such a nature that he never
thought about it. Then he has the problem of demonstrating he would
have relied on a hypothetical statement that the omitted facts were true.
This is the case where a presumption makes sense under the Implied
Causation Theory.
The answer to the scope question under the General Reliance The-
ory is not so clear. The Chasins, Mills and Affiliated Ute cases which
form the basis of the theory all involved nondisclosures. These cases
do not indicate whether they should be extended to cover the misrepre-
sentation and half truth cases. On one hand, the argument above, that
the common law was able to deal with a reliance requirement, indicates
no need for a special standard. However, the justification for the Gen-
eral Reliance Theory is different from the Implied Reliance Theory. In
addition to difficulties of proof, the General Reliance Theory's justifi-
cation seems to include that, given general reliance and a violation of
the rule, liability furthers the purposes of the rule. Thus, given general
reliance, and a misrepresentation or nondisclosure constituting a viola-
tion of the rule, the General Reliance Theory may imply liability or at
least a shift of the burden of proof to the defendant.
The SEC brief in the Affiliated Ute case,2 °7 and the Mills opinion 208
imply that difficulty of proof (or the meaninglessness of it) is an impor-
tant factor in the implication of reliance in the General Reliance The-
ory. Thus, difficulty of proof is certainly a positive factor in
recommending the presumption. This factor is, of course, missing in
the case of misrepresentations and half truths, as discussed above.
Since the present law seems to work well in these cases, there is no
reason to extend the presumption to misrepresentations and half truths,
though such an extension would be consistent with the General Reli-
ance Theory.
A more difficult case than that of half truths is that in which there are
mixed misrepresentations and nondisclosures, when there are no half
truths. The Affiliated Utle opinion seems to imply that the presumption
would not apply, unless the nondisclosures so far outweighed the mis-
representations as to be "primarily a failure to disclose. 20 9 Under
both the Implied and General Reliance Theories, however, it seems
better to apply the presumption whenever there is a nondisclosure.210
207. Brief, supra note 167, at 66.
208. Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
209. 406 U.S. at 153.
210. The General Reliance Theory, of course, requires proof of general reliance.
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As long as the plaintiff claims that he relied on a single nondisclosure,
he has the same proof problems, at least as far as that nondisclosure
goes, as if only nondisclosures were present. Therefore he should get
the benefit of the presumption. After all, he need only show that he
relied on one nondisclosure for the defendant to be a cause in fact of
his entering into the transaction, regardless of how many misleading
statements he believed or did not believe. Additional misleading state-
ments should not increase his proof problems in showing he relied on
the nondisclosure.
In accord with this analysis, in most of the circuits plaintiffs must
prove reliance in cases involving only misrepresentations."' Only the
Fourth Circuit has extended the Affiliated Ute presumption to
misrepresentations."' 2
The half truth issue is not as well settled. The Eighth Circuit in
Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., In ,213 refused to extend the doc-
trine to half truths. The Ninth Circuit, however, approves of the prac-
tice. 1 4 The case of mixed omissions and misrepresentations has been
widely held to be subject to the presumption though not in the Third
Circuit.2 15
211. See, e.g., Vervaecke v. Chiles, Hieder & Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978);
Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th
Cir. 1976); Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975); Schlick v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private
Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 584, 589-91 (1975). See Little v. First Califor-
nia Co., 532 F.2d 1302, 1304 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) (categories of omissions and misrepresentations
not exclusive). The matter is undecided in the Ninth Circuit, Keiman v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d
785, (9th Cir. 1980).
212. Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975).
when a broker misrepresents a material fact, or in the circumstances shown by the plain-
tiff's evidence in this case, fails to disclose information that the customer would consider
significant, it may be inferred that the customer would have relied on the broker's state-
ment or, in the case of nondisclosure, that he would have relied on the information had
he known it.
Id at 257, citing Affiliated Ute. The court continues enigmatically, "Affiliated Ute also teaches that
causation can be established by proof of the misrepresentation or nondisclosure." Id; see also
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 399-400 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield,
J., concurring and dissenting, construing Rule 14a-9 under Mills and Ute).
213. 578 F.2d at 717-18.
214. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
The class members' substantive claims either are, or can be, cast in omission or nondis-
closure terms-the company's financial reporting failed to disclose the need for reserves,
conditions reflecting on the value of the inventory or other facts necessary to make the
reported figures not misleading. The Supreme Court has recognized that under such
circumstances... 'an obligation to disclose, and this withholding of material fact estab-
lish[es] requisite element of causation in fact.'
Id at 905, 906.
215. Sundstrand v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977); Cameron v. E.M.
Adams & Co., 547 F.2d 473, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1976); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975) (alt. holding); Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Tital Group Inc. v.
Fagen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975); see also, Mills, 396 U.S. at 385; Swanson v. American
Consumers Industries, Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1973) (proxy cases). But see Huddleston v.
Herman E. MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1982) in which the
Ute presumption was not applied to a mixed case of misrepresentations and nondisclosures be-
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b. Is the Presumption Rebuttable?
The Affiliated Ute Court never used the word "presumption."
Rather, the literal holding of the opinion is that an "obligation to dis-
close and. . . withholding of a material fact establish. . . causation in
fact. ' 216 The opinion does not indicate whether the defendant can "re-
but" the plaintiff's "proof' of causatioii in fact through materiality.
However, since proof of causation is still required under the Implied
Reliance Theory, presumably because of the compensatory nature of
the Rule lOb-5 private right of action, there seems to be no reason
under that theory why the defendant should be liable for the plaintiff's
damages if he can show that there was no reliance, hence, no causation
in fact. Not only would this produce windfalls for nondeserving plain-
tiffs, but it would also create an unjustified distinction between the
causal element required for nondisclosures and misrepresentations.
The purpose of the presumption under the Implied Reliance Theory is
to help alleviate the plaintiff's difficulty of proof. Rebuttability of the
presumption is entirely consistent with this purpose.
Under the General Reliance Theory, these arguments also apply. If
the private action under the rule is thought to be compensatory in na-
ture then rebuttability seems to be in order. However, the General Re-
liance Theory seems to be based at least in part on a deterrent idea. In
fact, Chasins and Mills both indicate that general reliance establishes
the requisite causal connection; specific reliance is unnecessary. There-
fore, proof of specific "nonreliance" seems irrelevant. 217 However,
simple fairness seems to dictate that there should be no liability if a
lack of reliance on the specific omission is shown.
Consistent with this analysis, a rebuttability of the presumption has
been adopted in all of the circuit courts that have considered the
question.218
cause the conduct was characterized as half-truths, not omissions see note 214 supra. In Sharp v.
Cooper E. Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), a case involving mixed misrepresentations and
omissions, the Third Circuit rejected essentially the analysis presented here: "Although this reso-
lution would have great appeal to graduate logicians in a classroom, we can not be persuaded to
adopt it for use in a courtroom." 649 F.2d at 188. The court then adopted a flexible approach,
"analyz[ing] the plaintiffs allegations, in light of the likely proof at trial, and determin[ing the
most reasonable placement of the burden of proof of reliance." Id at 188.
216. 406 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added).
217. But see 480 F.2d at 399-400.
218. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978); St. Louis U. Trust Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, 562 F.2d 1040, 1049 (8th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977); Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (6th Cir. 1975);
Carras v. Bums, 526 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906-07 (9th
Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhodes, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F.
Supp. 279, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); but see Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374,
380-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (proxy case); 480 F.2d at 389-400 (proxy
case); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. Rev.
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6. A Common Error in the Application of Affiliated Ute
Though the Implied Reliance and the General Reliance Theories
normally give the same result in situations involving personal contact,
the two theories allocate the burden of proof on the issue of general
reliance differently. The Implied Reliance Theory accepts that, in cer-
tain cases, the defendant can rebut the Affiliated Ute presumption by
proof of a lack of reliance. In addition, proof by plaintiff of any reli-
ance is not required. The General Reliance Theory, on the other hand,
requires the plaintiff to prove general reliance to satisfy the causation
requirement. Since the Implied Reliance Theory2 19 is normally used,
the burden on the plaintiff which should be required by Chasins, Mills
and Affiliated Ute to show general reliance has erroneously not been
required.
Affiliated Ute did not mention the question of the burden of proof on
general reliance. In fact, the opinion does not explicitly require it to be
proven. However, general reliance was obvious in that case. In addi-
tion, the plaintiff was required to prove general reliance in Chasins and
Mills. The theory of Affiliated te that is advocated in this article
based on the Court's reliance on Chasins, the General Reliance Theory,
thus requires the plaintiff to prove general reliance before the causation
requirement is satisfied. Therefore, any court that applies Affiliated Ute
should first require proof of general reliance.
Unfortunately, such is not the case. Most courts ignore the contro-
versy between General and Implied Reliance, except when the issue
must be considered, as in cases of clear lack of general reliance like
Shapiro, Fridrich and Simon. In ignoring the General Reliance The-
ory, the courts also ignore the general reliance requirement. These
courts do not require general reliance to be proven; instead they apply
the Affiliated Tte "presumption" under the Implied Reliance The-
ory.220 Then, if defendant can prove a lack of reliance, the courts hold
that the presumption has been rebutted.22' This places the burden of
proof on the defendant, when it should be on the plaintiff.
This shift of the burden of proof reflects a fundamental error in the
courts' analysis of the Affiliated Ute decision. Since the holding ofAffll-
iated Tte mentions no general reliance requirement, the courts imagine
that materiality suffices to establish the requisite causal connection.
According to the analysis above, this is incorrect. Affiliated Ute does
584, 606 (1975); Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement under SEC Rule lOb-5,
24 CAsE W. REsERvE L. REv. 363, 388 (1973).
219. See note 172 supra.
220. See note 153 supra.
221. See note 218 supra.
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not stand for the proposition that materiality presumes causation. In-
stead, Affiliated Ute's holding is in accord with Chasins and Mills, to
wit, given materiality (a violation of the rule), general reliance estab-
lishes causation. Thus, even if such reliance is obvious (as it probably
normally is), the burden of proof should be with the plaintiff to estab-
lish at least general reliance.
7. Fraud on the Market-Blackie v. Barrack
The Ninth Circuit has used the List standard for "reliance" on omis-
sions and the ideas of the Implied Reliance Theory in Blackie v. Bar-
rack222 to perform the seemingly impossible task of implying market
traders "reliance" from material misrepresentations made by a stock
issuer to the public, even though the traders may have been unaware of
the misrepresentations. Though it may be difficult to understand how
one can rely on, i.e., believe in and act upon that belief in, misrepresen-
tations that one has no knowledge of, the Ninth Circuit "showed" that
not only is it possible to prove reliance but that reliance can be implied
by the materiality of the misrepresentations. In so doing, the Ninth
Circuit demonstrated the meaninglessness of the application of the List
standard in cases not involving general reliance and further diminished
the role of the causation requirement in Rule lOb-5 actions. Instead of
contorting the concept of causation in private actions under Rule lOb-
5 to arrive at the desired result, the court more properly should have
addressed the policy issues involved directly and made its decision
based on that analysis.
The Blackie case was an appeal from a lower court grant of class
certification in a class action under Rule lOb-5. 23 The plaintiff class
alleged that the defendant corporation 224 misrepresented its financial
statements over a twenty-seven month period by delaying disclosure of
large losses it had suffered. The plaintiff class consisted of all persons
who purchased securities of the defendant corporation during the per-
iod of the misrepresentations, whether or not they were aware of the
misrepresentations. The Ninth Circuit held that causation was no bar
to the class action because the Rule 1 Ob-5 causal requirement was satis-
fied by the materiality of the misrepresentations combined with plain-
tiff's market purchases. 25
222. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
223. See note 201 supra, for the application of the Afjliated Ute presumption in class actions.
224. The corporation's officers and independent auditors were also defendants.
225. The Ninth Circuit gives no reasons for its unprecedented choice of the applicable causal
standard. It is clear, however, that the court did apply the List standard: "[Tjhe causational chain
is broken only if purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known of the misrepre-
sentation; [i]n this context we think proof of reliance means at most a requirement that plaintiff
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Though the opinion is sometimes difficult to follow, the most reason-
able synopsis of the court's reasoning seems to be that in this situation,
(1) transaction causation is demonstrated if plaintiffs can show that
they would not have traded had they known that the misrepresenta-
tions were untrue,226 that is, if the List test for reliance on an omission
applies, (2) the materiality of the misrepresentations circumstantially
establishes that some traders relied on them, (3) that reliance inflated
the price of the stock, (4) because most traders would assume that the
price of the stock was inflated by the effect of the misrepresentations, if
they had known of such misrepresentations, they would not have
purchased the stock, (5) because it is desirable for traders to be able to
"rely" on the fair setting of the price of stock in public markets, (6) be-
cause plaintiffs did rely generally on this fair setting, and (7) further-
more because under 4ffiliated Ute and Mills, materiality is so close to
reliance and the distance from reliance to materiality is reduced by (4),
material misrepresentations and plaintiff's open market purchases suf-
fice to show reliance.
For some unexplained reason the court uses the List standard for
reliance on omissions for transaction causation in the market situation.
The court is, in essence, treating the misrepresentations as if they had
been omissions or nondisclosures.227 Since plaintiff has no special
problems in showing actual reliance on, that is, belief in and action on
that belief in the misrepresentations, there is no justification for the
court's use of the List standard.228 This use of the standard results, of
course, in a vast expansion in the number of possible plaintiffs. Instead
of being limited to those who were aware of the misrepresentations and
who could show actual reliance, the class consists of all who could
show they would have acted differently had they known the misrepre-
sented facts were false, even though they may have been unaware of
the misrepresentations.229 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has gone even fur-
ther than the List standard, holding that the transaction causation stan-
dard is met if plaintiffs can show they would have acted differently had
they known not only that the omitted facts were true but also that such
Wrve directly that he would have acted differently had he known the true facts." 524 F.2d at 908.
e court does say that the misrepresentations involved in the case could be "cast in omission or
nondisclosure terms-the company's financial reporting failed to disclose the need for reserves,
conditions reflecting on the value of the inventory, or other facts necessary to make the reported
figures not misleading," id at 905, which conclusion would lead to use of the List standard. How-
ever, there is no apparent connection between the court's seemingly offhand remark about recast-
ing misrepresentations as omissions and its use of the List standard.
226. See note 225 supra.
227. See text accompanying note 204.
228. See text accompanying notes 119-128, supra.
229. See note 225 supra.
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facts had been misrepresented to the public.2 30
Not only has the class of possible plaintiffs been greatly enlarged
through the use of the List standard, a finding of defendant's liability
has become much more likely. The List causal standard is not difficult
to meet. Material misrepresentations almost by definition affect the
market price of a stock, as the Ninth Circuit points out.231 If only an
unreasonable trader would not have acted differently had he known a
material, omitted fact, then only an utter fool would not have acted
differently had he known that a detrimental material fact had been mis-
represented to the market. Once this point in the opinion is reached, a
so-called Affiliated Ute-Mills presumption of reliance from materiality
might as well be made, especially in the context of a class action.
Enough of those plaintiffs were probably not fools, so that the burden
of proof of nonreliance belongs rightfully on defendant. 23 2
The Ninth Circuit broke with precedent dramatically in reaching this
result. Since plaintiff can show actual reliance on misrepresentations,
courts almost uniformly require such proof. Using the List standard in
cases involving misrepresentations is to abandon the necessity of belief
and action on that belief in favor of reliance on events that did not
occur and unjustifiably expands the class of possible plaintiffs. Perhaps
the most compelling argument against the "causal standard" exposed
by the Ninth Circuit in Blackie is the simple observation that the court
found the requirement of transaction causation satisfied in a situation
in which it was absolutely clear that plaintiffs had no knowledge of the
misrepresentations, could not have believed in them and, hence, could
not have relied on them.
The ideas of the Blackie opinion are more defensible in situations
involving true omissions to the market rather than misrepresentations.
As applied to such a case the reasoning of Blackie would be similar to
that of Shapiro. Under the Implied Reliance Theory, as exemplied by
Shapiro in a case involving omissions, the List standard of reliance
would be used as a matter of course. The transaction causation re-
230. 524 F.2d at 907-08.
231. If the basis of the court's use of the List standard is that defendant's misrepresentations
can be cast in terms of omissions or non-disclosures, see note 225 supra, then the criticism still
applies. Casting misrepresentations as omissions results in the same unjustified expansion of the
plaintiff class from those who had knowledge of the misrepresentations to all those who would
have acted differently had they known the true facts.
Since plaintiff has no special problems in showing actual reliance on misrepresentations, such a
recasting of the misrepresentations as omissions with the subsequent unjustified increase in both
the size of the class of possible plaintiffs and the likelihood of a finding of causation seems
unreasonable.
232. The BMackie court argued that trader's "generally rely" on the fair setting of the market
price of the stock. 524 F.2d at 907. However, this "general reliance" bears no relation to the
"general reliance" involved in personal dealings required for the General Reliance Theory.
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quirement might well be satisfied then by proof of defendant's material
nondisclosures in connection with plaintiff's open market purchases.
Of course, under the General Reliance Theory no "general reliance"
would be present in such a case,233 the List standard would not apply
and no reliance could be found.
Analysis of the Blackie opinion emphasizes the meaninglessness of
deciding causation under the List standard, except in situations involv-
ing personal dealings and general reliance. Given materiality, applica-
tion of the List standard of reliance on an omission practically
guarantees a finding of liability. The proper focus of inquiry in cases
involving omissions on the open market should not be causation at all,
but policy. Decisions dependent on the hypothetical List standard
mean little in terms of the compensatory rationale of the causation re-
quirement. Moreover, decisions dependent on causation are "all or
nothing" in the open market context--either the defendant suffers
"Draconian" liabilities or none at all. As is the conclusion below,2 34
what is needed is a direct public, noncausation, determination of liabil-
ity in the market context.235
8. Causation and the Open Market
Most cases dealing with causation and the open market analyze the
problems in terms of whether Affiliated Ute should apply or not. How-
ever, the Affiliated Ute presumption is merely a convenience of proof.
The real issue in the open market setting is not whether Affiliated Ute
applies, but whether causation can be established or not. Under the
List standard for reliance on an omission, causation can be established;
under the Fridrich-Simon general reliance requirement it cannot be.
The problem stems from the difficulty in defining "reliance on an omis-
sion." This problem will remain undecided and undecidable until the
causation question, which is ill-defined and even meaningless in this
situation, is replaced by the real issue; whether public policy should
impose a duty to disclose in the open market situation such that nondis-
closure should lead to liability.
233. See note 232 supra.
234. See text at pages 1064-65 infra.
235. The Fifth Circuit recently decided a case somewhat similar to Blackie. Shores v. Sklar,
647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), involved misrepresentations and omissions in defendant's offering
circular used in the initial offering of municipal bonds to the public. Plaintiff did not read the
offering circular. However, in an opinion remarkable for its lack of understanding of reliance and
causation in Rule lob-5 law the court held that the Rule lOb-5 requirement of transaction causa-
tion was satisifed by proof that "defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities into the mar-
ket which were not entitled to be marketed, intending to defraud purchasers" and that plaintiff
"reasonably relied on the [blonds' availability on the market as an indication of their apparent
genuiness and ... as a result of the scheme to defraud. [Plaintiff] suffered a loss." The dissent in
Shores adequately points out the deficiencies in the opinion.
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The threshold question in approaching a causation on the market
issue under present law is whether the Affiliated Vte "presumption" ap-
plies. The two basic theories of Affliated te give disparate results.
The General Reliance Theory, approved here as the most accurate the-
ory of Affiliated Ute, soundly dismisses the idea of an Affiliated Ute
presumption here. In fact, the impersonal open market is the antithesis
of the normal General Reliance situation. Thus, the two major Gen-
eral Reliance Theory cases, Fridrich and Simon, clearly indicate that no
Affiliated Ute presumption should apply in the open market context.236
On the other hand, the Implied Reliance Theory, the theory of Affiliated
Ute which has been widely accepted, implies the Affiliated Ute pre-
sumption regardless of the relationship between the parties. Therefore,
the Second Circuit in Shapiro" 7 found causation in the open market
context.
The heart of this difference in analysis, however, is not the applica-
tion of Affiliated Ute. The Affiliated Ute presumption is a mere conven-
ience in proof for the plaintiff. The real difference in Shapiro and
Fridrich-Simon is whether there can be causation in an impersonal set-
ting. Shapiro holds that there can be, really basing its opinion on List v.
Fashion Park.23 Fridrich and Simon base their rejection of such cau-
sation by requiring general reliance as a prerequisite to causation.239
The Implied Reliance Theory is based on the closeness of materiality
to the List standard of reliance on an omission. Since the List standard
is, by its terms (though not by the case itself) independent of the rela-
tionship between the parties, the Implied Reliance Theory is also
thought to be independent. Thus, the application ofAffiliated Ute to an
impersonal situation is based on the assumption that List is applicable.
On the other hand, the General Reliance Theory of Affiliated Ute
requires general reliance before Affiliated Ute applies. Thus, this the-
ory implies that Affiliated Ute is not applicable to impersonal situa-
tions. Fridrich and Simon go beyond this rejection of Affiliated Ute and
require general reliance before any causation by an omission can be
proved. Thus, the real difference between Shapiro and Fridrich-Simon
is whether List is applicable to the impersonal situation or whether
some general reliance is to be required first.
The List theory of causation by nondisclosure states that a nondis-
236. Simon, however, was not an open market case.
237. The Ninth Circuit inBlackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (1975) (alternative holding) makes
a similar holding.
238. To imply reliance from materiality of a nondisclosure, the List standard must be used.
See text accompanying notes 139-142 supra.
239. This is only the negative part of the General Reliance Theory. See notes 124 and 181,
supra.
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closure "causes" an event, if some other result would have occurred if
the nondisclosed facts had been disclosed. The Fridrich and Simon
cases, on the other hand, reject the idea that a "nonevent" could
"cause" anything, requiring proof of causation by the actual conduct of
the defendant. These different views lead to opposite results in the
open market situation. Any nondisclosed material fact can probably be
shown to have "caused" a transaction under the List standard in the
open market situation. However, without any personal contact or flow
of information, no nondisclosure is a "cause" under Fridrich-Simon.
The difference between these two theories is really one of the basic
definitions of reliance (or causation) on a nondisclosure. The List test
is essentially a "but for" test, i.e., if "no nondisclosure" then a different
result would occur, interpreting "no nondisclosure" as "disclosure to
the plaintiff." The General Reliance test is essentially a reliance or be-
lief test-was the plaintiff relying on the defendant's conduct? This of
course also reduces to a "but for" test, but one of different focus-was
the defendant's conduct a "but for" cause of the plaintiffs entering into
the transaction?
The difficulty in deciding between the two theories arises because
they both have strong roots in the case of causation by a misrepresenta-
tion. In the case of a misrepresentation, the two tests not only give the
same results, they are identical upon the assumption that in the case of
misrepresentation, the misrepresentation itself is the "conduct" scruti-
nized in the theory. Both tests, therefore, are "but for" tests on the
"event" of the misrepresentation. They appear to be different because
they focus on slightly different phrasings of the reliance question. The
General Reliance Theory asks-did plaintiff rely on the misrepresenta-
tion? That is, did the plaintiff rely on the defendant? The List test
asks-would plaintiff have acted differently if he had known of the
misrepresentation?
The problems arise when these questions are translated to the case of
a nondisclosure. The List test translates easily: would plaintiff have
acted differently if he had known the true facts? The General Reliance
Theory is not so easy: did plaintiff rely on the omission? This question
is interpreted as "did the plaintiff rely on the defendant?"; a require-
ment of general reliance on the defendant's activities.
The difficulty in choosing between these two standards demonstrates
an important point: Causation infact is afact.240 Only events cause
other events. Nondisclosures like all events that did not happen, cause
nothing, cannot cause anything. When one speaks of nondisclosures
240. PROSSER, supra note 1, §41, at 237.
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and causation, one is just taking the factual theory of causation on an
event and applying it to nonevents. However, causation by a nonevent
is just a myth. It is a myth paid homage to for purposes of public pol-
icy, but it is a myth nonetheless.
Causation, including causation by a nonevent, is used as a conve-
nient way to eliminate certain plaintiffs and certain defendants from
consideration. In the case of actual events there is some inherent "jus-
tice" in this. In the case of nonevents the idea of causation is only one
of public policy, to a much greater extent than that of misrepresenta-
tions in which causation is a fact.
Since public policy gives no clear causation standard, in the open
market situation, the policy questions should be addressed directly in
determining liability, instead of using an unworkable test, which was
designed for convenience in the first place. The correctness of this con-
clusion is demonstrated by the vast difference between the effects of the
two tests for causation. The General Reliance Theory leaves the de-
fendant scot-free for actions clearly contrary to public policy. The Im-
plied Reliance Theory imposes "Draconian" liabilities, holding
defendant liable for all losses by anyone who traded in the stock while
the information was undisclosed. It is obvious from these results that
causation is not the correct focus for inquiry in this situation. This con-
clusion was seen clearly by the drafters of the Federal Securities
Code.24' Ignoring the causation issue in the open market situation,
they create a remedy on policy grounds, holding the defendant liable to
all losing traders in the time period, but only to the extent of his own
gains.242
Some solution like that of the Code is sensible. Continuing to phrase
a policy issue in terms of causation can only lead to confusion and
injustice.243
C. Reliance and Causation under the Federal Securities Code
The ALI Federal Securities Code2" proposes a new approach to-
241. See note 244 infra.
242. FED. SEC. CODE §§1703(b) (liability), 1708(b) (measure of damages) (Proposed Official
Draft 1978). Section 1708(b)(3) states that
the measure... [of damages] is limited as if all the plaintiffs, together with all the
members of the class in the cause of a class action, had bought (or sold) only the amount
of securities that the defendant had sold (or bought) ....
243. This discussion is equally applicable to the change in the definition of causation by the
Ninth Circuit in Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (1975).
244. See generally FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1978). The concept of a coherent
codification of the various federal securities laws arose with the Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Asso-
ciation. See generally, Hershman, 4n Overview-Regulation of Securiies and the Securities Markets:
.4 Timely Report to the Bar, 78 Bus. LAW. 375 (1973). The American Law Institute, accepting the
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wards causation in the Rule lOb-5 situation. Under the Code, no trans-
action causation need be shown to establish liability for fraud in
market transactions,2 45 for defendant's fraudulent purchase from or
sales to the plaintiff,2 46 for market manipulation (except to non-trad-
ers),247 for false filings,248 or for churning.249 In certain other situa-
tions,250 the Code adopts the present causation requirement. Thus, the
Code follows the current trend in the law towards a weakened causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's entrance
into the transaction.
The basic code section on civil liability for violation of a 10b-5 type
action is Section 1703. Subsections 1703(a) and (b) address the com-
mon Rule lOb-5 situation:
Sales and Purchases by Fraud or Misrepresentation Sec. 1703(a)
Transactions Not Effected in the Markets
If the transaction is not effected in a manner that would make
the matching of buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous, a
seller or buyer who violates Sections 1062(a)(1) [misrepresenta-
tion or fraudulent act], 1602(b)(1)(A) [failure to correct previous
misstatement], 1063(a) [inside information], or 1613 [violation of
Commission rule] is liable to his buyer or seller for rescission or
damages.
(b) Transactions Effected in the Markets-If the transaction is
effected in a manner that would make the matching of buyers or
sellers substantially fortuitous, a seller or buyer who violates
Sections 1062(a)(1), 1062(b)(1)(A), or 1613 is liable for damages
to a person who buys or sells during the period beginning at the
start of the day when the defendant first unlawfully sells or buys,
and undoing at the end of the day when all material facts (or
facts of special significance in the case of Section 1603(a)) be-
come generally available.
These subsections apply only to situations in which the defendant deals
directly with the plaintiff (i.e., defendant is a buyer or seller and plain-
tiff is the corresponding seller or buyer) or when the defendant trades
on an impersonal exchange. In such a case the Code precludes any
question of causation if the defendant commits a fraudulent act (in-
task, selected Professor Louis Loss of the Harvard Law School as the Reporter for the Code. See,
Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969).
245. FED. SEC. CODE §1703(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
246. Id §1703(a).
247. Id §1710.
248. Id §§1704, 1705, 1706.
249. Id §1717.
250. Id §§1709(a) (fraud in a fiduciary relationship); 1709(c) (fraud by investment advisors);
1710(e) (market manipulation with respect to non-traders); 1715 (unlawful trading procedures);
1721 (violation of rules of self regulatory organizations).
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cluding an omission if there is a duty to disclose) or makes a misrepre-
sentation in connection with the purchase or sale or fails to correct a
statement which is a misrepresentation at the time of the transaction or
has material inside information or violates a rule of the Commission.
In the case of actual direct dealing between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, the defendant is liable for rescission or damages. In the open mar-
ket case, defendant is liable to all who bought (if he sold) or sold (if he
bought) from the date of defendant's first unlawful transaction until the
day when the information becomes "generally available."25 ' Damages
in the open market are the same as in the direct dealing situation. De-
fendant is liable up to the amount of his profits.252 The many possible
plaintiffs in the open market sharepro rata in the fund created by the
defendant's disgorgement.
253
However, in the open market case the defendant has a defense if he
has "corrected" the misrepresentation or omission. 254 This defense
does not apply if the plaintiff bought before the correction or if he justi-
fiably relied "on the misrepresentation or omission.''255 In this case
"[r]eliance on an omission may be proved by proof or reliance on the
particular filing or document and ignorance of the omission; but reli-
ance on either a misrepresentation or an omission may be proved with-
out proof that the plaintiff read a particular filing document.
25 6
The causation requirement is also eliminated in the Code for claims
based on misrepresentations or omissions of material facts in filings
257
251. Id §1703(b).
252. See note 242 supra.
253. FED. SEC. CODE §1711 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
254. Id §1703(d). Defendant can correct his misrepresentation or omission by "a filing or
press release or in any manner reasonably designed to bring the correction to the attention of the
investing public . Id
255. Id
256. Id This comment is nicely understood in terms of the theory developed in the earlier
sections of this paper. "Reliance on an omission may be proved by proof of reliance on the
particular filing or document and ignorance of the omission .... ," that is, general reliance on the
filing or document establishes "reliance" on the omission. This is close to the holding of Chasins
and Mills. It is, of course, half of the General Reliance Theory. "[Blut reliance on either a mis-
representation or an omission may be proved without proof that the plaintiff need a particular
filing or document." The Code thus rejects the restrictive half of the General Reliance Theory,
that general reliance is needed to show reliance on an omission. Thus, the ideas of Simon and
Fridrich are rejected.
257. Such a claim may be based on Sections 1704, 1705 or 1706. Section 1704 creates civil
liability for misrepresentations and omissions of material fact in an effective registration state-
ment, an effective offering statement or any report filed with the SEC and incorporated by refer-
ence in any such filing. An alternative to this section would also include the annual report filed
with the SEC, id §1704(e); see id §602. This liability attaches to the registrant, the principal
executive officer or officers, the principal financial officer, the principal accounting officer and the
directors of the registrant, experts and other persons named with their consent in the document,
and underwriters in the case of an offering statement. Id §1704(d). Eligible plaintiffs under Sec-
tion 1704 are those persons who bought a security in a class covered by the offering statement, the
registration statement, or report, after their effectiveness. Id §1,704(c). Section 1705 creates civil
liability for the registrant for misrepresentations made with scienter in filings with the SEC not
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with the SEC, or on public misrepresentations.25 The defendant in
such actions has the defense of correction as in Section 1703(d), dis-
cussed above, which can be avoided by the plaintiff by a showing of
justifiable reliance.259 Finally, actions based on churning260 and mar-
ket manipulation and stabilization (brought by traders),26' which by
their nature need no proof of transaction causation, have no such re-
quirement under the Code.
The present causal requirement is left intact in the Code in several
situations. Thus, violation of a fiduciary duty through a misrepresenta-
tion, nondisclosure, or failure to correct makes the fiduciary liable for
the damages "caused"2 62 to the beneficiary. The same causal standard
applies to cases involving market manipulation or stabilization (non-
traders), violation of the rules of certain self regulatory organizations,
fraud by investment advisors and unlawful trading practices.263 Reli-
ance will be important where proof of causation is required just as in
the present law to establish under Section 303(19)(A) that the conduct
was a substantial factor in producing the loss.21
The reason for the relaxation of the causation standard in Rule lOb-5
type situations is not explicitly given in the comments. However, since
Sections 1703(a) and 1704 of the Code are based on Sections 12(2) and
11 (a) respectively,265 of the Securities Act of 1933,266 the policies of
these provisions would seem to control. Neither of these provisions of
the present law calls for proof of transaction causation, presumably be-
cause of their deterrent nature.
covered under Section 1704. Section 1706 applies Section 1704 and Section 1705 in certain situa-
tions to secondary distributors and underwriters with respect to distribution statements.
258. Section 1707 creates civil liability for a company making public misrepresentations with
scienter to anyone buying thereafter.
259. FED. SEC. CODE §§1704(d), 1705(d), 1707(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
260. Id §171. Churning is defined and forbidden in Section 1606:
It is unlawful for a broker, dealer, municipal broker, or municipal dealer to effect with or
for a customer with respect to whose account he or his agent exercises investment discre-
tion, or is in a position to determine the volume and frequency of transactions by reason
of the customer's willingness to follow his or his agent's suggestions, transactions that are
excessive in volume or frequency in light of the amount of profits or commissions of the
broker, dealer, municipal broker, municipal dealer, or his agent in relation to the size of
the account, the needs and objectives of the customer as ascertained on reasonable in-
quiring, and the pattern of trading in the amount.
261. FED. SEC. CODE §202(19) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). "Caused.-A loss is 'caused' by
specified conduct to the extent that (A) the conduct was a substantial factor in producing the loss,
and (B) the loss was of a kind that might reasonably have been expected to occur as a result of the
conduct."
262. See note 242 supra.
263. FED. SEC. CODE §202(19) comment (5) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
264. Id. §§1703(a) source and comment (1), 1704 source.
265. 15 U.S.C. §771(2) (1976) and Id §77k(a) respectively. Section 1703(a) extends coverage
of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 to plaintiff sellers as well as buyers; see comment (1).
266. FED. SEC. CODE §1705, comment (3), citing 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1750-54; 6 Loss,
supra note 2, at 3862-63.
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The relaxed causation of Section 1705 is explained in a comment to
that section: Section 18(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
today imposes much too onerous a burden on the plaintiff in requiring
him to prove not only reliance but also that he bought or sold "at a
price which was affected by" the misstatement, and then limiting him
to "damages caused by such reliance." Section 1705's attempt to for-
mulate an action that is reasonably compensatory-or at any rate
serves as a reasonable deterrent-and that at the same time is so cir-
cumscribed that "the punishment fits the crime. 2 67
Section 1710 on market manipulation also requires no proof of trans-
action causation. There are two ways of considering proof of transac-
tion causation in the market manipulation setting, neither of which
would require proof of causation aside from that of manipulation.
First, the plaintiff may "rely" on the manipulation in that he is relying
on the fairness of the value of the security in question. 68 In that case,
proof of manipulation and the plaintiffs transaction suffice to show
causation. Second, the manipulation situation can be thought not to
involve transaction causation at all-plaintiff is injured merely by trad-
ing in the manipulated market. In that view, of course, there is no need
for proof of reliance.
Section 1717 on churning also obviously needs no proof of reliance.
Reliance on the plaintiffs part is not needed for perpetration of the
fraud.
Thus, the reason the Code eliminates the causation requirement of
Rule lOb-5 type private actions under Sections 1703(a), 1704, and 1705
is to enhance their deterrent effect. This elimination is justified by the
minor expansion of the present law necessary to bring about the inclu-
sion of Rule lOb-5 into these sections. Actions for churning and mar-
ket manipulation (to traders) simply require no proof of reliance by
their natures. Justification for the Code's treatment of open market
fraud in Section 1703(b) is discussed below.
Several other powerful reasons exist for the Code's elimination of the
causal requirement in certain situations. Both the Implied and General
Reliance Theories help to justify this change in the law. In addition,
the privity requirement of Section 1703(a) provides an adequate reason
for elimination of proof of causation in that case. These are basically
two situations covered under Section 1703. The elimination of the
267. Section 1710 creates civil liability for market manipulation by touting, Section 1609(a),
by wash sales and matched orders, Section 1609(b), by trading, Section 1609(c) or by buying
during a distribution, Section 1609(d), and for stabilization, defined in Section 1610(a) as violation
of an SEC rule while effecting a transaction for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the
price of a security of the issuer.
268. This is akin to the Blackie "fraud on the market" theory.
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causal requirement can be justified by different reasons in each situa-
tion. In the direct dealing situation, the deterrent value of punishing a
violation of the Code, the probability of "general reliance" given priv-
ity, the difficulty of proving reliance on an omission, the probability of
reliance where the misstatement or omission is material, and the cost of
dealing with the causation issue all might justify elimination of the
causal requirement. The same purpose in the market situation is
served by the deterrent value of punishing a violation, the difficulties in
finding a definition of causation fair to both defendants and plaintiffs,
and the Section's restriction of defendants possible liability.
In the direct dealing situation of Section 1703(a), the defendant has
profited from a violation of the Code, directly from the plaintiff. The
reasons listed above all suggest that no requirement be imposed that
the loss to the plaintiff stem directly from specific reliance on the viola-
tion itself, since, given privity, there probably was general causation
between the defendant's actions and his profit and plaintiffs loss.
Though each of the reasons has a different focus, all stem from the
feeling, that, given general causation of the loss, a violation of the Act,
and profit to the defendant, plaintiff should be compensated.
This "general reliance" is a result of the direct dealings between the
parties. Since the defendant bought from or sold securities directly to
the plaintiff, the plaintiff, except in very unusual circumstances, proba-
bly relied on the defendant not to make misrepresentations or omis-
sions he was obligated to make. The General Reliance Theory then
would impose liability on the defendant upon the establishment of a
violation of the Code, either presuming (perhaps rebuttably) that reli-
ance on the specific violation occurred or possibly only requiring gen-
eral causation as the causal standard.
The reasons for this relaxed proof under the General Reliance The-
ory is that the defendant should "pay" for his violation of the Code
(and perhaps be deterred from future violations). This purpose is very
strong here, where the defendant has directly profited fom the plain-
tiff's loss. This deterrent purpose and the "unjust enrichment" are the-
ories for liability even without proof of reliance on the specific
violation.
The Implied Reliance Theory justifies the same result. Since the vio-
lations in Section 1703(a) all involve material facts, the Implied Reli-
ance Theory would (perhaps non-rebuttably) presume reliance. The
presumption of course comes from the conclusion that few reasonable
men would not rely on material misrepresentations or omissions. Thus,
this theory also helps to justify the elimination of the causation
standard.
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A final justification is the time-honored theme of judicial costs.
Proof of non-reliance is difficult and complicated. Given the strong
probability of failure, as the Implied Reliance Theory implies, there is
good reason to foreclose this theory altogether.
These justifications can be put simply: The defendant acted wrongly,
so profiting from the plaintiff, who almost certainly relied. Therefore,
plaintiff should recover; proof of non-reliance is expensive and most
likely to be unsuccessful, so it will not be required.
Of course, balanced against these rationales is the fear that, inevita-
bly, some plaintiffs whose loss was not caused by the specific violation
will recover. In writing a Code, however, difficult choices of this kind
must be made and the move to simplicity seems adequately justified,
especially in light of present Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.
The open market situation has been discussed above. In that case,
there is a very strong purpose to prevent insider trading. Additionally,
causation is meaningless in that situation. Accordingly, the elimination
of causation and its replacement with the limitation on defendant's lia-
bility is not only justifiable, it is a clear improvement in the present law.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty and questionable value of proof of a non-disclosure
has led to a relaxation in the causal connection that must be established
to succeed in a private action under Rule lOb-5. This "relaxation" was
developed in Chasins by the Second Circuit, and in Affiliated Rle, by
the Supreme Court, reflecting a similar change in Rule 14a-9 in the
Mills case. The new standard is stated simply: Specific reliance or cau-
sation by a nondisclosure is not required; only general reliance on the
defendant's conduct need be proven.
The common interpretation of the Affiliated Ule case, that material-
ity "presumes" reliance is incorrect. The two views of the case lead to
the same result, however, in the normal Rule 1Ob-5 situation. Even in
that case, however, where there is personal contact between the parties,
the scope of the application of Affiliated Ute is uncertain. The policies
behind that case under either theory indicate that the "presumption"
should be rebuttable and that it should be confined to cases of omis-
sions and mixed omissions and misrepresentations. In those cases, the
theories are not in complete agreement, there is a difference in the allo-
cation of the burden of proof of general reliance under the two views.
In the impersonal situation, the interpretation of Affiliated Ute ad-
vanced in this article agrees with the Sixth Circuit in the Fridrich case
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that the Affiliated Ute case is inapplicable. Thus, the Second Circuit's
opinion in Shapiro is rejected as an application of Affiliated Ute.
The true conflict between Shapiro and Fridrich, however, is not in
the use of the Affiliated Ute opinion, but in the definition of reliance on
an omission. Shapiro uses the characterization of reliance as causation
in fact and thus applies a "but for" test in accord with List: The omis-
sion caused the plaintiff to enter into the transaction if he would not
have done so had there been disclosure of the omitted facts. Fridrich,
on the other hand, focuses on reliance as belief or dependence: the
omission caused the plaintiff to enter into the transaction only if he was
already relying on the defendant's conduct. Both of the definitions em-
body certain of the ideas of the concept of reliance on an omission.
Neither is clearly correct in the nondisclosure situation. Since neither
of the definitions of reliance is plainly correct the focus of the inquiry
should not be on a difficult to define causal notion, but on policy di-
rectly. This conclusion applies as well to the Ninth Circuit's extension
of the causation definition to include "indirect reliance" in the "fraud
on the market" theory. Such a policy solution to the impersonal mar-
ket situation is presented by the ALI Federal Securities Code. The
Code requires no proof of causation. Instead it imposes liability on al
defendants trading in the market. The harshness of this result is alevi-
ated by strict limitations placed on the extent of the defendants' total
liability.
The Code also eliminates the causation requirement in several other
situations now actionable under Rule 10b-5. This relaxation of the old
element of common law fraud is justified by the deterrent effect of the
provisions. In addition, the ideas developed in the cases, reducing the
requisite causal connection under Rule 1Ob-5, help to justify the elimi-
nation of the causation requirement in those cases.
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